

DOCUMENTATION OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN TURKISH SOURCES

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Foreword

When Raphael Lemkin, responding to the Nazi annihilation of many peoples, developed the concept of genocide, and campaigned effectively for the adoption by the United Nations of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, he initiated a new field of study, and an extension of the humanitarian concerns of international law to protection against an ancient and persistent scourge.

However, much remains obscure in our understanding of genocide. Even at such a basic level as the biological nature of man we are confronted by totally antithetical theories. The destructive proclivities are certainly abundantly testified in the annals of history. And at the same time we are asked to accept the theory that there are such powerful human inhibitions against mass murder that the dehumanisation of the victims is an indispensable precondition.

The contradiction of man's annihilatory violence and concerned humanitarianism is part of our daily experience. On the one hand, atrocities are reported from all over the world, torture is institutionalized as a routine instrument of government in many states, and starvation is deployed as a weapon in ethnic conflict, as in the Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia. And on the other hand, there is the sudden spontaneous outpouring of humanitarian aid for the victims of natural and man-made disasters, and other daily expressions of empathy for the afflicted in their suffering.

Much research is needed into the conditions under which the destructive tendencies are expressed in genocide and other mass killings, and how they can be restrained, and energy directed to broad concern for the welfare of our species. A few scholars have devoted themselves to the study of genocide as a general phenomenon; the available supporting research is however limited and uneven.

The Holocaust (but only as it pertains to the Jews) dominates the field of case studies. It is probably the most researched topic in the history of human society, prolific beyond the capacity of the human mind to absorb the overwhelming flood of publications. What a great service it would be if some of the vast sums expended on this scholarship were devoted to research on many past genocides now buried in obscurity, and to the prevention of threatened genocides presently in process.

The Cambodian and Armenian genocides share with the Holocaust some of the present public awareness. They are both past and contemporary genocides. Horror at the incredible cruelty of the Khmer Rouge regime persists. *Izvestia* described it on November 2, 1978 as a vast concentration camp, a gigantic prison, a state of barracks socialism aiming at the construction of an historically unprecedented society, opponents being eradicated along with their families by disembowelment, by beating to death with hoes, by hammering nails into the back of their heads, and by other cruel means of economizing on bullets. Yet the Khmer Rouge continued to represent Cambodia in the United Nations, and there is the present danger that it may again return to power. We are subjected to the spectacle of the incredible chicanery in the inter-national system, and the primacy accorded to bizarre conceptions of national self-interest.

The systematic annihilation of Armenians, for which the leading ministers of the government in World War I were found guilty by Ottoman courts-martial and sentenced to death, has also become a contemporary issue. This is a result of the Turkish government's denial of the genocide, pursued aggressively by interference in the internal affairs of other states, and supported by threats to the welfare of vulnerable groups and the strategic interests of great powers. An incontrovertible genocide, the denial would be without significance but for the massive web of corruption spun by the Turkish government.

Indeed, corruption and Machiavellian deception were already deeply embedded in the initial planning and in the execution of the genocide, as Vahakn Dadrian demonstrates in his contribution to the section of four chapters in the present volume devoted to the denial of genocide. Euphemisms concealed the genocidal intent, camouflaged as "deportation" necessitated by wartime "relocation." "The deceptive stratagem of two-track orders" provided coordination of the genocide, overt orders for deportation being "not infrequently attended by covert orders of extermination," or understood as such. The employment of codes contributed to the veiling in secrecy of the operational strategies. And finally, the perpetrators of the genocide took the added precaution of a vast destruction of incriminating archives.

Nevertheless, Professor Dadrian has succeeded in extracting authoritative documentation of the crime of genocide from what he describes as "an exiguous number of randomly surviving documents," amplified by ancillary material. His main sources are the first-hand evidence supplied by high-ranking officials in the Ottoman court-martial proceedings, the memoirs of former military

commanders and civilian officials, and comments from editors and historians. It is an outstanding work of scholarship, and taken in conjunction with his 1989 article entitled "Genocide as a problem of national and international law: the World War I Armenian case and its contemporary legal ramifications," it constitutes a major contribution to the rebuttal of the denial.

Roger W. Smith's analysis of the denial of the Armenian genocide deals with some of the universal features of denial as rejection of fact and as defence mechanism, as rationalization and justification by dehumanization of the victims, and as distortion by ambiguity, euphemism, and literalness. He supplements this by discussing the specific functions and characteristics of the Turkish denial, and emphasizes the importance of placing the Armenian genocide as fully and truthfully on record as possible. In his discussion under the heading "Critical Challenges Which Face This Field Today," he quotes Vigen Guroian's comment that the "capacity of a nation to transcend its past depends upon its willingness to remember it conscientiously, report it truthfully, and criticize it publicly." Presumably Germany has confronted its Nazi genocidal past, and France has conscientiously acknowledged its participation in the Nazi annihilation of Jews, and Soviet Russia now recognizes its Stalinist mass murders and genocides including the deportation of peoples from the Caucasus to the Siberian permafrost. But can one feel secure that none of these regimes will engage in ethnic massacres or pogroms? And if the Turkish government had faced its past with integrity, might it not still have conducted its present oppressive campaign for the forced assimilation of Kurds?

In any case, the fact that denial continues the genocide on a moral and cultural level is more persuasive. Erich Kulka's chapter in the section on denial in the present volume leaves no doubt that the denial of the Holocaust is inspired in many circles by the same motivation that led to the annihilation of Jews. This comes as no surprise in the case of neo-Nazi groups; however, it is deeply disturbing to note its penetration in academic circles, in the form of outright or implicit denial, and more subtly by diminishing its significance.

In one passage Dr. Kulka refers to "the special guilt that belongs to a cultured people whose elite classes too, participated in the guilty actions." This assumes that the cultured, and particularly the cultured elite, should be resistant to annihilatory appeals and motivations. But this must surely be dependent on the content of the culture, its norms and values, which may predispose the dominant elite to the contemptuous and alienating dismissal of other groups. And contemporary technological developments, and increasing bureaucratic elaboration and sophistication, may call for elite participation, and indeed leadership, in oppressive and annihilatory regimes.

The architects of apartheid, with its ruthless exploitation of African labour, and the brutal uprooting and deportation of Africans, were the academic and spiritual elite, drawing their mandates from biblical texts. And in their wonderful new book, *The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat*, Lifton and Markusen (1990) devote a central chapter to the initiating and executing roles of professionals

in the Holocaust, and their indispensable creative role in nuclearism, with its threat of omnicide and the extinction of our world. These are the new category of "Killing Professionals." In this connection, one of Eric Markusen's welcome contributions to this volume documents the participation of professionals in genocide. He qualifies the argument, as it were, by reference also to the selection of professionals as targets of genocide, and professionals' involvement in resistance to and prevention of genocide. But even with this qualification, he has shown the central role of professionals in the new technology of annihilation, which without doubt introduces a more threatening dimension to the evolution of genocide in the future.

The case studies in the section on denial are limited to the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. There is of course a vast field for case study analysis, particularly bearing in mind Roger W. Smith's comment that the denial of genocide is now routine. One thinks, for example, of the Burundi government's denial of its genocide of Hutu in 1972, or the rich materials in the United Nations' debates on Bangladesh, or the protection extended to Uganda during the Amin regime, and the eloquent denunciation of this protective stance, and generally the technology of denial developed by member states of the United Nations as they shield offending governments. Has the United Nations become a nursery for genocide?

Israel W. Charny's contribution to "The Psychology of Denial of Known Genocides" widely extends the scope of, the analysis in his comprehensive classification of denials of ongoing and past genocides, and his disturbing "Templates for Denial of a Known Genocide." And at the level of individual reactions, he explores the psychology of perpetrators and victims and their children, supplemented by original questionnaire research that probes reactions to challenging postulated situations.

With hindsight, it does seem incredible that victims should not have recognized the clear indications of impending doom. But the victims are often captive groups with no means of escape, or assurance of acceptance in areas of immediate asylum, or as refugees in a new country. Bystanders could certainly make a contribution in the early stages of a genocide. However, once the genocidal process is well under way, with licensed professional killers and the institutionalization of terror and torture, and tanks and armored cars moving like dinosaurs through the streets, it is only persons of heroic caliber who could make a stand, such as the rescuers who are the subject of an outstanding chapter by Pearl M. and Samuel P. Oliner, "Righteous People in the Holocaust."

Their conclusion from a study of rescuers and non-rescuers is that the distinguishing characteristic of rescuers is "a tendency to attach themselves to others and to assume responsibilities for them, and to do so inclusively, that is with respect to a wide variety of groups and people." This corresponds in some measure to "Species Mentality," proposed by Lifton and Markusen as the antithesis of the Genocidal Mentality, and defined as "an expansion of

collective awareness, an altered sense of self that embraces our reality as members of a single species."

The recent normative revolution that made the rights of individuals the subject of international law represents a movement toward a broad sense of humanity, characterizing the rescuers in the Oliners' study and also species mentality. But as David Kader comments, the existence of laws-on-paper does not mean that they exist in reality. Indeed, they are more honored in the breach than the observance. Nevertheless, these innovations in human rights law have promising potentialities for the future, and many non-governmental organizations dedicate themselves to the promotion of individual human rights.

Humanitarian intervention is also a doctrine supportive of the extension of human concern for the oppressed, with deep roots in the evolution of inter-national law. However, major obstacles impede acceptance of the doctrine, particularly in the United Nations, as a result of the overemphasis on the sovereignty of states and non-intervention in their internal affairs. Barbara Harff concludes her analysis of these issues with the observation that international lawyers, scholars, and policymakers have not been able to agree "on how to achieve an acceptable balance between the necessity to restrain war among nations (aggressive intervention) and to develop effective means (humanitarian intervention) to restrain criminal actions by states against their citizens, e.g. genocide." Yet the whole development of law for the protection of individual human rights implies forms of intervention, and actual intervention has been, and continues to be, almost routine in the present state of international relations.

Addressing the same issue, Michael Bazylar (1987) has argued for the acceptance of humanitarian intervention under the following conditions: (a) large-scale atrocities; (b) overriding motivation by humanitarian concerns; (c) preferably joint international action; (d) intervention limited to accomplishment of the humanitarian objective; and (e) exhaustion of other remedies. And he ends his article with the comment, "The world cannot sing away the atrocities of Ethiopia."

Since the encouraging international developments in individual human rights and other humanitarian norms are vitiated by failure in implementation, there is an urgent need for immediate preventive action in this most violent and murderous century. This emerges with great force in Eric Markusen's comparative analysis of "Genocide, Total War, and Nuclear Omnicide." We do seem to stand now at an evolutionary turning point and as Markusen observes, "either we find new ways of living together in what we are finally recognizing to be an endangered habitat, or we run the very real risk of being the first species to extinguish itself through conscious choices and actions."

There are contributions we can make at three levels of preventive action. The first is raising awareness of genocide and promoting an extension of human and humanitarian concern toward species consciousness. The teaching of genocide in comparative perspective can promote these objectives and the five

concluding chapters in this volume are directly or indirectly relevant to this goal.

Jan Darsa's bibliography on the Holocaust overwhelms by the sheer magnitude of the resources available in the form of annotated bibliographies, lists of films and resource guides, curricula materials, and a vast outpouring of case studies. One cannot help reflecting that it would be a great social service if some of these resources were also devoted to research on the forgotten genocides and preparation of teaching resources and curricula guides about these other events. To the extent that the teaching of the Holocaust is set in a broad context, as in "Facing History and Ourselves," it can contribute to a more inclusive humanitarian involvement. However, where the emphasis is on the unique quality of the Holocaust, raising barriers to concern for the genocides of other peoples, it is retrogressive, in delaying movement toward an inclusive humanitarianism, and also retrogressive in the context of the development of a humanistic Jewish tradition. Darsa's chapter in any case does set teaching of the Holocaust in the larger context of an example of teaching about all genocides, and her chapter is also coupled with Samuel Totten's chapter on teaching about genocide.

Samuel Totten's two chapters contribute further to his dedicated work for promoting the teaching of genocide in comparative perspectives. They are particularly impressive in their concern for the forgotten genocides, the catastrophic traumas of small peoples, and in his suggestions for creative teaching. His second chapter, "First-Person Accounts of Genocidal Acts," is a reminder that these accounts offer "a uniquely valuable source . . . a personal perspective that graphically and powerfully depicts what the horrors of genocide mean to the individual." Part of the problem in promoting awareness of genocide is that the sheer immensity of mass murder evokes an instinctive recoil and a seemingly inhuman — or perhaps it is all too human — indifference, whereas first-person accounts promote empathy and insight into the catastrophes of annihilation.

While the aesthetics of the memorialization of the Holocaust reflect the interplay of competing interests, cultural perspectives, religious traditions and iconography, and political ideologies, the memorials can also be centers of public education, as Sybil Milton reminds us in her chapter on Holocaust museums, memorials, and centres. Presumably most of these centers would be preoccupied with introspective, ethnocentric concentration on the traumatic past of their victimized group. But clearly there are significant educational potentialities in the aesthetic interweaving of evocative images with brief texts, and networks of memorials for different genocides, and network exhibitions could promote a more comprehensive awareness of genocide.

Appropriately, this volume ends with the creative contribution by Herbert Hirsch and Roger W. Smith on "The Language of Extermination in Genocide." They observe that in the social construction of reality, language not only represents perceptions of reality, but begins to constitute it; and they draw attention to the role of sacred myth, the pejorative use of language against the prospective sacrificial victims, and

euphemisms which sanitize mass murder, a gentrification of annihilation. Clearly there is an imperative need to raise awareness of the lethal functions of language in genocide. However, education on genocide, though potentially significant, is not an end in itself. At a second level of preventive action, there is a need to interweave awareness and commitment with action. In much the same way that movement along a continuum of destruction facilitates the final apocalyptic holocausts, so too a continuity of interventions on behalf of the afflicted may contribute to effective preventive action against genocide.

The third level of preventive action calls for effective sanctions. It would be an illusion to rely on the United Nations, which is an intimate part of the problem of genocide, not its solution. We need to rely much more on our own non-governmental resources. Sometimes quite simple measures may be surprisingly effective, as for example, a threatened boycott of the products of multinational corporations ravaging the rain forests with the incidental annihilation of the indigenous groups living in ecological harmony with their environments. The infrastructure is already present in the great proliferation of non-governmental organizations responding to the inadequacies of intergovernmental organizations.

Hopefully, Israel W. Charny, whose initiative in planning and editing these bibliographies has already contributed so much to our work, will now devote the next bibliographic volume to the many aspects of strategies available for the prevention of genocide and the fostering of a species mentality.

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Introduction

Volume 2 of *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review* continues where we left off at the end of the very well received first volume in the sense that the topics reviewed here were not included in the earlier publication and continue our study of the many different aspects of genocide. It is intended as a second in a series in which still further volumes are to be expected. Except in Part I, "Special Section on Denials of the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide," the Contributing Editors were instructed as in the previous volume to summarize the existing knowledge base in the field of study about which they are reporting, to identify critical questions which need to be addressed in future scholarship, and to evaluate the prospects for progress in regard to those questions.

As in the first volume, the decision has been continued to allow for some multiple entries of the same bibliographic items by different Contributing Editors in so far as the bibliographic item is seen as specifically relevant to the different subjects being covered, and the same principle has been applied as far as repetition of some bibliographic entries that appeared in the first volume. With this, in a number of cases, in order to avoid undue redundancy, the reader is referred to the full citation that is presented in another chapter either in this volume or in the first one.

The "Special Section on Denials of the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide" requires and deserves its own introduction.

First of all, it is without doubt a collection of writings that is intended to express anger at the insults of denials of known genocides, from whatever sources of hate groups and violence mongers, irresponsible academicians who betray the canons of scholarship, or cynical, manipulative governments with

all the power of state that is theirs to wield. Denials of known genocides — such as of the Holocaust and Armenian genocide deliver still another assault on the victim peoples by denying their memories and histories much as if one had witnessed the murders of one's parents or children or wife or husband and then the murderer baldly removed the bodies, hid them and claimed to the police that no crime had ever taken place. The deniers are also insulting all of us who have a stake in maintaining the integrity of the historical record.

Given civilization's record of terrible cruelty on every level of human organization, where so many peoples and societal systems have committed themselves to torturing and to destroying many human lives, for some of us the only hope for a measure of sanity and for our retaining a hopeful identification with our species lies in our civilization's capacity for scholarship, or knowing and understanding, so that perhaps some day we will have learned enough to be able to intervene and prevent genocide. Yet the deniers will not even let us keep our ability to know. They are true enemies of all that seeks to be civilized.

All the writers in this special section address the deniers and the phenomena of denial with some of this passion. In this respect, Dr. Erich Kulka's chapter on denials of the Holocaust deserves to be mentioned in particular, in that the author is not only a bona fide historian at one of the great universities of our time, who writes with scholarly detail and acumen about the revisionists, he is himself a full-blown "graduate" of Auschwitz. Dr. Kulka's passionate condemnations of those who deny the gas ovens of the Holocaust are a reminder to all of us that we dare not become caught up in our occupations as scholars and academicians and so involved with the words, documents and data of our scholarship that we forget to feel passionately the enormity of the subject, for what is at stake is nothing less than more human lives in the future, like the lives of the tragic millions of victims of the past.

Vahakn Dadrian's relentless scholarship on the Armenian genocide also breathes passion, the deep feeling of an Armenian who one senses is crying out for his murdered relatives and nation; and the determined courage of a scholar who dares to go into the lion's pit of the Turkish intent to expunge the records of the Armenian genocide. Dadrian's task is to wrest from between the lion's teeth all shreds of evidence not yet destroyed. His chapter amounts to a brilliant academic "scoop," as he presents here for the first time a trail of evidences of the Armenian genocide *from Turkish sources*. He does this in the face of a phenomenon which is later to be repeated in the Holocaust, perhaps even more "successfully," namely that the genocidal murderers go to great lengths to conceal their commands at the time that they are given, so that to this day there is no piece of documentary evidence of Hitler ordering the Holocaust, and there are relatively few records of actual Turkish orders to kill the Armenians.

Even if no documents have ever been found with Hitler's signature ordering the organized killings of the Jews, there has never been any denial of the killings by a successor government of Germany (although East Germany put off formal

acknowledgement of its role in the Holocaust until its final days in 1990). In the case of the Armenian genocide, seventy-five years later, the full forces of the successor government of Turkey are committed to censorship (the editor of the Turkish Encyclopaedia Britannica was arrested some years ago because of references to the Armenian people in the encyclopaedia), rewriting of history (Turkish maps of the past erase the very presence of Armenia, let alone that Turkish historical versions of the period of the genocide have included claims that the government was relocating the Armenian people to a hospitable environment "like Florida" and protected them en route!); and, using the full weight of government power, Turkish diplomatic interventions include *threats, harassment and intimidation* of those who would discuss the Armenian genocide, the goal being to close down conferences, cancel screenings of films, and even to bar formal days of commemoration. It is in the context of such massive efforts by the government of Turkey to suppress and manipulate information — an ominous reminder of the extent to which government power can be used against all that is civilized — that Dadrian's remarkable chapter presents a record of the Armenian genocide in Turkish sources.

It might be noted that Professor Vahakn Dadrian was one of the earliest students of comparative aspects of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, on which he published in 1975 (Dadrian, 1975), and in recent years he is at the crest of his dedicated research including, in addition to the path breaking chapter in this book, two extraordinary research documents: one (Dadrian, 1986) authenticating the infamous Talaat telegrams in which Turkey's then Minister of the Interior gave explicit orders to exterminate the Armenians and enjoined Turkish soldiers not to show mercy towards any Armenian man, woman or child; and most recently (Dadrian, 1989) a sterling study of the judicial process of the post-Ottoman Turkish government trials of those who committed the genocide during a brief period before the Turkish government adopted its policy of denial.

Roger W. Smith's chapter on the denials of the Armenian genocide also represents largely a "first" or original contribution to the scholarly literature, certainly vis-à-vis the specifics of denials of the Armenian genocide which have not been assembled in any earlier systematic scholarly study to my knowledge. I would add that, like most scholars who have dared to study the Armenian genocide, Professor Smith has also been the object of Turkish-government representations, even at the ambassadorial level, criticizing his ostensible lack of knowledge of the true events of the time. His reasoned yet quietly passionate chapter provides further evidences of the Turkish government's incessant efforts to control the historical record as presented in articles, books, and encyclopaedias, even television and movies, even scholarly conferences, also in news reports. As indicated earlier, Turkey does not hesitate to utilize threats of the considerable power that can be amassed by a modern government, even to the extent of threatening to breach a major military alliance with the United States, and even to the extent of threatening Israeli political interests and perhaps even Jewish

lives for nothing more than broadcasts of television films or the convening of a scholarly conference in which the Armenian genocide is discussed (see Charny, 1983, for a full report of Turkish pressures on the Israeli government to close down the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide in Tel Aviv in 1982).

The special section opens with an essay on the psychology of denial of known genocides by me. It is, regrettably, a chapter with few annotated bibliographic entries, because there is virtually nothing in the psychological literature that deals with such degrees of mindlessness as the denials of known major historical events other than perhaps in the context of madness - and mad the revisionists technically are not, any more than most of those who commit genocide are (see Charny, 1982a). There is, of course, a psychological literature on denial in the psychology of the individual, but it is only allegorically relevant to efforts to rewrite the very history books of civilization. There is also, of course, a social-psychological literature on propaganda, which is considerable, but it refers largely to planned, conscious malevolent hate literature and intended incitements of prejudice and violence. The classic anti-Semitic document, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, for example, paints a picture of Jewish scheming and power in order to mobilize hatred against the Jews. Some of the propaganda of revisionism is definitely in the same genre, but I am also convinced that a good deal of revisionism represents a new type of corruption of the mind which appeals in a different way to a blind *unconscious* sympathy and identification with the destructive motivations that revisionism serves without conscious blatant anti-Semitism or anti-Armenian motives.

I am particularly interested in revisionist thinking that relies on the documents and authority of academicians who provide "evidences" that the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide actually did not take place, and I am struck by how many of the academics who adopt these ideas uncritically do so without conscious malevolence or propagandistic interest in anti-Semitism or anti-Armenianism. In an earlier work (Charny, 1982b), I have described how sacrificing or delivering other people to the death we all fear is a basic psychological mechanism that enables many seemingly rational human beings, from all walks of life and in all cultures, to participate in committing genocide, or to be accomplices and bystanders. I hope that the present chapter on the psychology of denials of known genocides will contribute still another step to the development of a comprehensive psychological theory of the genocidal process.

It should be noted that in three of the four chapters, which constitute the "Special Section on Denials of the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide," there are few annotated bibliographic entries. In the cases of Kulka and Dadrian, what are provided are documentations - references attesting to the sources of items cited, and these are provided in traditional reference style; and in my own chapter, as I have explained, there is virtually no literature on the specific subject.

The rest of the volume follows the basic format created in the first volume and which is intended as the structure for a continuing series. In Part II, David Kader and Barbara Harff provide a basic review of two aspects of the legal literature on genocide: Kader on the development of basic law for a crime so monstrous yet which has escaped the full attention of civilization's legal process; and Harff on the legal background and justification for a forward-looking concept which would enable principled and responsible interventions in cases of genocide by third parties who would not be serving their own national or political interests in the process; their two respective chapters are followed by a joint chapter of an annotated bibliography of law and genocide. Hopefully, this review of the potential but still virtually unharnessed basis for legal moves against genocide and against the perpetrators of genocide will contribute to new initiatives in legal thought and action on the subject.

Part III presents insightful and comprehensive chapters on education about the Holocaust and genocide by Jan Darsa and Samuel Totten. Both share the philosophical conviction that the study of any single instance of genocide, such as the Holocaust, is at one and the same time a study of the never-ending genocidal process which attacks one people after another, as the victimizers, their accomplices and their tragic victims play out archetypal roles in the specificity of a given historical-cultural-political context. Jan Darsa, a member of the staff of Facing History and Ourselves, a group which is pioneering developing educational programs on the Holocaust and genocide throughout the United States, concentrates on teaching about the Holocaust's unique enormity, but deftly remains connected to the questions the Holocaust raises about basic human nature, and to its culture-transforming message of the dangers that can face all peoples at different times in history. Samuel Totten, who also contributed some of the basic curricular materials to Jan Darsa's companion chapter, organizes masterfully the literature on curricula and on inservice training about genocide. Totten, who has authored several important special issues of journals for educators on human rights and genocide (Totten, 1985 and 1987; Totten and Parsons, 1991), provides a thoughtful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of materials in the field of education with respect to confronting the subject of genocide - the number one killer of all time in human civilization. Together, the two chapters should prove very valuable to educators and administrators who are seeking to expand and improve teaching about the Holocaust and genocide.

Eric Markusen studies the relationships between genocide, total war, and nuclear omnicide. The definitional dilemmas are difficult, though in my opinion they yield more easily to those who are resolute in their basic objections to mass deaths to human beings under any circumstances other than an inescapable context of self-defense (such as a war against a manifestly murderous nation like Nazi Germany). It might appear foolhardy to take a stand against the mass murders that are as if incidental to bona fide events of war as opposed to blatant campaigns of genocide such as the Holocaust and the

Armenian genocide. On the other hand, the means of warfare in use in our twentieth century, including massive fire-bombings and nuclear bombings of cities which bring about the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians; in the case of nuclear weapons, in addition to the dead and wounded, the maiming of additional thousands and thousands for generations to come; despite its being outlawed by international convention, the use of poison gas, such as in the Iran-Iraq war, by Iraq against the Kurds, earlier by North Yemen against its southern neighbor, with virtually no response by the international community; looking towards the future, the likely proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of smaller governments and even terrorist political groups, also the increasingly known availability of terrifying biological weapons, and the looming development of new forms of super-futuristic weapons of massive annihilation — all of these must shock every decent human being who fears for his own life and for the lives of his loved ones, and cares about the lives of his fellow human creatures — into concern about the prospects for multiple genocide and omnicide in wars.

When planet Earth becomes an overflowing morgue for millions of people, it will be too late to look back at the silliness of scholars who had split hairs about defining genocide to reflect *only* pure intentions to destroy a specific target people in its totality or near-totality, and who therefore left out all other instances of mass murder as if they were a "something else" that was not deserving of the special concern and special measures that should be directed at the prevention of genocide. It will also be too late to chide the leaders and "high priests" of different cultures who insisted on the uniqueness, exclusivity, primacy, superiority, or greater significance of the specific genocide of their people, which they insisted was not to be compared with or spoken about in the same vein as the mass murders of any other people (see Kuper, 1990). For, in the end, the victims of multiple genocide, omnicide, and (what I have called in a fictional futuristic essay [Charny, 1990]) perhaps even *planetocide*, will likely be peoples of many different religions, ethnicities, and nationalities dying together on a heartless common Earth, and then it will be only too clear that all the definitional squabbles and competition for the status of "most important genocide" weren't worth a damn.

Eric Markusen's second chapter is on a deeply painful subject to those of us who spend our working lives taking pride in being *professionals*. By definition, especially in helping professions such as medicine, social work, and clinical psychology, but actually in all professions, the goal of professionals is to help one's clients live longer and better. Yet many professionals become arch-murderers and accomplices to murder when genocide stalks the land. The bulk of data on this painful subject are connected with the Holocaust, and perhaps it is just as well that this is the case since the Holocaust also is the single most overwhelming demonstration in human history of how a near-total society and all of its institutions — including its legal system, scientists, religious leaders, and physicians - can be devoted to the creation of a systematic industry of senseless

torture and death of helpless innocents of all ages. The revelation that professionals, and professional organizations, can be rotten with primitive hatred and indifference to human beings and their lives is another devastating nail in the coffin of our illusions about the goodness of man, and a vital challenge to the development of new definitions of training and ethical monitoring in professional societies which, some day, might become devoted vanguards in the protection of human life.

Sybil Milton, a distinguished veteran scholar of the Holocaust, develops an excellent review of existing memorials, museums, and study centers devoted to the Holocaust, and in the process probes penetratingly basic issues in the art, documentation, and memorial of an event so horrendous that it is subject to irreparable disconnection from its own true reality by the very processes of recording, portraying, and displaying it in public memorial and museum institutions.

In his second chapter in this volume, Samuel Totten sensitively defines and tracks the development of a literature of first-person accounts of victims of the Holocaust and various other genocides that is being assembled, slowly and surely, to create undeniable documentation of the human suffering that has taken place at the hands of the genociders. Totten combines his very useful survey of existing documents with an important analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of oral histories and first-person accounts.

Pearl M. Oliner and Samuel P. Oliner write with the authority of personal experience and many years of dedicated research into the phenomena of righteous people in the Holocaust. Their subject is fascinating even in its specificities of stories of members of our human species who did not bend to the over-whelming evil of their time and, at risk of their lives, set out to save Jewish lives in the Holocaust. The researches summarized and reviewed by the Oliners are, of course, pieces of a larger still unknown puzzle of how, and whether, human civilization as a whole can move toward a broader culture-wide commitment to protecting human life and opposing all would-be slaughters of innocent people when such policies are promoted by brutal leaders, institutions, and governments.

Finally, political scientists Herbert Hirsch and Roger W. Smith take on a difficult task of studying the rhetoric of genocide. There is an enormous power in the use of language by a genociding state and culture which, sometimes it seems without much effort, "succeeds" in defining the targeted victim people as beyond the pale of humanity or membership in the human species, therefore no longer deserving of legal protection or humanistic consideration. The subject is not one to be relegated to our scholarly interest and curiosity, for these linguistic definitions have the power to transform those who do the actual mass killing to unfeeling, unaware functionaries who are as if following orders to fumigate cockroaches, whereas most of these same murderers would have had strong moral qualms were the victims clearly perceived as their own kin. Typically, (he tasks of killing are renamed by the authorities to be

something else — measures for the better "health" of the national body, "eugenic improvements" of the race, "security measures" to protect the majority of the citizenry, anything but slaughter and open-and-shut murder. The task of understanding the psycholinguistic patterns and mechanisms which mediate the emotions, experience, and ultimately decisions about the behavior of the perpetrators of genocide is of crucial importance. As Hirsch and Smith point out, the literature on the subject is sparse, and it is very much to be hoped their contribution will stimulate new, creative researches that are vitally needed in this area.

The successful completion of a book such as this inevitably requires a fine team-work of many people. I want to express my special appreciation to Pauline Cooper, Managing Editor of the Holocaust and Genocide Computerized Bibliographical Database Project at the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, for her steadfast commitment and support, and for her skilful coordination of communications with Contributing Editors and the publisher, assembly of manuscripts, and tracking of the many phases of the editing and organization of the final product.

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Continuing appreciation is due Elchanan Rosenheim, who heads the computer-services firm of Bamberger-Rosenheim Ltd. in Tel Aviv, for considerable financial contribution to the Institute through many kindnesses of reduced fees for services rendered in maintaining and updating our computer equipment, let alone for the reliability and excellence of these services.

To our editors and publishers, Mansell Publishing Ltd., London, I want to express our appreciation for the excellent design and production of the first volume in this series, creation of an effective co publishing partnership with Facts on File in New York for the American edition of the book, and for encouragement to continue the development of this series.

To the Contributing Editors to this volume, some of whom were contributors to the first book as well, and to all the Contributing Editors to the Holocaust and Genocide Computerized Bibliographic Database Project, many thanks for a level of cooperation and a sharing of mutual commitment that often go far beyond what one normally experiences in cooperative academic projects. The spirit of devotion to the scholarship of Holocaust and genocide, and the atmosphere of fellowship which characterizes many of the interactions of people working on these projects, are a source of strength and pleasure to me, as I trust for many of them.

The strongly positive reception given the first volume of *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review* has been very gratifying and of course has encouraged our further efforts. We have been especially pleased to learn how much scholars everywhere are using the volume repeatedly as an ongoing resource for their research and writing. We are also very grateful for the financial support and encouragement given by the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., an agency of the United States government, to our Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide for our Holocaust and Genocide Computerized Bibliographic Database Project.

Finally, as in respect of other books that I have published during the last ten years of my life, I have the pleasure of acknowledging and appreciating, with deep love, the encouragement, support, love, and many instances of specific assistance that I receive from my dear Judy Katz-Charny, my best friend and wife.

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Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in Turkish Sources

Vahakn N. Dadrian

INTRODUCTION

The compilation of a bibliography dealing with an instance of genocide that is being categorically and often vehemently denied by the perpetrators and their progenitors is intrinsically a far more challenging task than handling one which is relatively free from the impairments of such denials. To be overcome in this regard are severe obstacles central to which is the quest for official documents attesting one way or another to the act and the associated fact of the genocide in question.

The paramount import of such primary sources for the documentation of the Turkish genocide against the Armenians is evidenced by the array of methods through which batches of state and party documents have been made to disappear immediately prior to and in the wake of Turkey's military defeat in October 1918. Bibliographic undertakings by necessity are, therefore, restricted to exploring an exiguous number of randomly surviving documents which may be located and secured.

One of the cardinal facts of criminal law is the allowance made for imperfect probative evidence incident to certain types of crimes. The conspiratorial organization of the crime of genocide, accentuated by the enormity of the nature of the crime itself, is a consideration that goes a long way toward explaining the scantiness of clear, ample, and incontrovertible evidence in this regard. One has to search for and marshal ancillary material which is circumstantial in nature but which, together with direct evidence, may warrant an overall judgment about the occurrence of a genocide.

In order to appreciate the extraordinary value of the residual Turkish documents on the Armenian genocide, a brief survey of the methods through which the balance

of the *corpus delicti* has been rendered unavailable or inaccessible, or has been made to disappear, may be in order. The methods include acts of concealment, withholding, and destruction of material evidence inculcating the Ottoman state organization and the top echelons of the highly secretive, monolithic, and conspiratorial Ittihad party, dominating and usurping that state organization. No one can be sure of the extent to which the vanishing documents were genocide-related. Although not in all instances the sets of residual documents deal with the Armenian massacres, enough of them are so identified. The highly secretive nature of the decision to exterminate the bulk of the Armenian population of Ottoman Turkey resulted in a substantial reduction of the *corpus delicti* in the first place. Moreover, the onset of a panicky fear of drastic retributive justice at the end of the war led to a string of endeavors to extirpate the balance of incriminating evidence. As will be noted below, the parties involved in this scheme of evidence removal were not confined to officials identified with the Ittihad but embraced a broad spectrum of Turks unable and/or unwilling to confront the political and legal consequences of a massive state-sponsored crime.

Nevertheless, a host of high-ranking officials supplied first-hand evidence in the course of a series of court-martial proceedings instituted in the 1918-20 Armistice period by successive Ottoman governments anxious to exact punishment from the perpetrators involved. However exercised and reluctant, these officials in various forms of testimony grudgingly admitted to a scheme of deportation the covert intent and end-result of which was the actual destruction of the masses of the deportees. Another group of Turks, mostly former military commanders and civilian officials, recounted their relevant observations and knowledge through memoirs. Still another group, consisting mostly of editors, historians, and other personages, felt constrained to concede the exterminatory thrust of the anti-Armenian measures.

In nearly all these accounts three elements appear constant and recurrent. The authors use a style and diction which is best characterized as hedging. The admissions of various degrees of guilt are counterbalanced with the insertion of the standard Turkish charges of Armenian provocations, including acts of sabotage, espionage, and sedition. Further, the Armenian losses are relegated to insignificance by injecting into the picture Turkish losses whereby the distinct category of victims of organized massacres is purposefully confounded with the non-specific and general category of victims of warfare. Losses (Turkish) incurred in pursuit of military victory against armed opponents are fully juxtaposed with nearly totally trapped and defenseless victims of mass murder so as to becloud the central issue and dilute the basis of Armenian clamors for justice.

What needs to be stressed at this juncture is the extraordinary value of those fragments of admission of guilt recorded in personal narratives by mostly first-hand witnesses and observers, identified with the perpetrator group. They are extraordinary for twin reasons. First, the high risk of opprobrium, if not

persecution, was very acute for those authors in whose lifetime the memoirs were published under active personal supervision. The incidental, casual, scattered, and often insinuating tenor of these specimens of acknowledgment of guilt cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In their total configuration they provide the contours of a genocidal scheme overshadowing the deficiencies of parcels of testimonial evidence throughout these works.

Second, the probability of editorial deletions, doctoring, and overall modifications in the case of posthumous memoirs touching on the problems of Armenian genocide cannot be discounted. When a topic nationally is treated as taboo, no editor or publisher will dare to contravene such a prevailing mood — a mood which has the leverage of a sweeping mandate.

As soon as Cemal Kutay, Talat's biographer, began to serialize *Talat's Memoirs* in the Turkish newspaper *Tercüman* on December 3, 1982, one of the editors of *Son Havadis*, another Turkish daily, in six successive issues (December 24–29, 1982) pointed out the discrepancies and irregularities surrounding the assertion that these were authentic memoirs stemming from the pen or mouth of Talat himself. He, therefore, politely invited Kutay to prove that his material was authentic by producing it — through printing the facsimiles of the original scripts involved. Kutay failed to respond to the invitation. It is equally appropriate to point out in this connection the fact that before Talat's notes could be released for publication, Dr. B. Şakir, one of the chief organizers of the Armenian genocide, "screened them." This fact was communicated to the German Foreign Office on May 21, 1921 by Weismann from Berlin's Public Safety office in a report detailing the activities in the German capital of the fugitive Ittihadist leaders. He refers to Dr. B. Şakir's *Sichtung der Memoiren Talaat Pascha* (Politische Abteilung Ili/Türkei PO 11 No. 3, File 1).

To sum up, any testimony which even tacitly, conditionally, or partially may be confirming the fact of the genocide is magnified in importance given the constraints described above. The fact is that editorial "adjustments" in the case of posthumous memoirs can, without hesitation, be presumed to have been undertaken for the protection of Turkish national interests rather than the vindication of Armenian claims. Therefore, such incriminatory testimonial evidence as might be extracted from these memoirs is by necessity minimal and sparse.

The bibliography will end with the exposure of material highlighting the emergence of a pervasive denial syndrome in Turkey. This phenomenon may be defined as a reflection of a national ethos pioneered by a host of prominent leaders, including two Presidents of the modern era of the Turkish Republic, and the late dean of Turkish historians.

THE PROBLEMS OF DEFLECTION AND OF MISSING AND WANING DOCUMENTS

One major form of concealment through deflection involved the deliberate misportrayal in formal transactions and policy declarations of the nature and intent of the anti-Armenian measures; these were defined as mere "deportations" for the purposes of wartime "relocation." Besides being deceptive, this formula was also functional in two respects. First, it aimed at lulling and trap-ping the victims, thereby facilitating the goal of subsequent destruction at mini-mum cost. Second, it provided the basis for denials of genocidal intent in post-crime accounts.

Acts of Avoiding Material Evidence

The Key Indictment of the Turkish Military Tribunal, court-martialing the authors of the Armenian genocide, repeatedly underscores the secret, conspiratorial aspects of the instructions and orders of the Ittihadist party chieftains decreeing the death of the Armenian victims. In the Yozgat trial series, the coded ciphers of two military officers were introduced as prosecutorial exhibits, revealing the fact that the term "deportation" was a code-name for "massacre" or for "destruction." The Key Indictment cites the testimony of a provincial governor confirming Talat's personal verbal instruction to a Supervisor of Deportations to the effect that the aim of deportation was destruction. Another governor personally testified that when he was ordered to interpret the order of deportation as one for massacre, he demanded to see the secret instruction. The Responsible Secretary of the province (the title denoting the idea of a party inspector, and connoting that of a commissar for the coercive implementation of Ittihad's decisions) refused him access to his notebook where the instruction was hand-recorded. He was relieved of his post within two weeks. So were Ankara's former governor Mazhar and Aleppo's governor Celal. The same Indictment cites the case of two other governors who were ambushed and killed for refusing to act without receiving specific written orders for massacre. The Key Indictment as well as the Harput verdict cite one prominent cipher in the possession of the Court in which Special Organization field director, Dr. B. Şakir is inquiring of Harput Responsible Secretary Resneli Nazim whether the area's Armenians are being liquidated or merely being deported. In his closing arguments at the trial of Responsible Secretaries, Procuror-General Şevket, citing this cipher as incontrovertible evidence, declared that the designation deportation was clearly a cloak for the underlying intent of extermination. The Yozgat verdict is emphatic on this point when stating that there can be no doubt about this. So is the Trabzon verdict.

Perhaps the most salient feature of this aspect of avoiding the creation and maintenance of official records on decisions and acts that are conspiratorial in nature and carry heavy responsibilities for the officials involved is Talat's use at his

home of a telegraphic apparatus. American Ambassador Morgenthau relates an incident whereby he personally observed Talat transacting official business from his home when he unexpectedly had to see him on an urgent matter. Talat's wife in his memoirs confirms the latter's use of the apparatus at his home. At the twelfth sitting of the Yozgat trial series, Hilmi, the city's Post and Telegraph bureau chief informed the Court through an affidavit of this practice in the provinces. Yozgat's Interim Governor Kemal, who later was found guilty and executed as a chief perpetrator of massacres against the Armenians, was described as using the telegraphic apparatus like a telephone, carrying out lengthy and on-the-spot exchanges with Ankara's Responsible Secretary Necati.

Acts of Removal of Evidence

The Key Indictment numerous times cites the Special Organization as the arch-instrument of organized massacres against the Armenians, indicating at the same time that Dr. Nazim and (Erzurumlu) Aziz, the Director of Public Security (an outfit akin to the American FBI), were heavily involved in setting up and running that organization. In the same Indictment, the two are described as the men responsible for the removal of sizeable portions of inculcating documents. It is for this reason that the framers of the Indictment refer to "the residues of the Special Organization papers" when discussing evidence issuing from that outfit. During a search on December 12, 1918 by the military police at the home of attorney Ahmet Ramiz, a brother-in-law of Dr. B. Şakir, a suit-case full of inculcating documents was found and impounded; these documents were later to be used as prosecution exhibits during the court-martial proceedings. In the second sitting of the top Ittihadists and Cabinet Ministers' trial, M. Şukru as well as Z. Gökalp and K. Talat confirmed this act of removal. In the fifth sitting Şukru was again interrogated about the laxity allowing such removal. In an interview with an Armenian newspaper, Acting Interior Minister Izzet verified that act also, as did various Turkish newspapers.

Another significant intruder in the plot to remove evidence, some of which might have had probative value in the prosecution of the Turkish criminals, was the German general Hans F.L. von Seeckt, the last Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Armed Forces in World War I. When returning to Germany after the war, he took with him large portions of the files of the Ottoman General Staff, with Dr. Riza Tevfik, the Minister of Education, publicly berating the German general for that deed. When the then Grand Vezir, Izzet Paşa, lodged a formal protest, Seeckt promised to return those which might be judged as falling into the jurisdiction of the Turkish military.

Finally, reference may be made to the statement of "a confidential secretary" in charge of the secret wartime records of the Interior Ministry to the effect that before the onset of the Armistice certain officials in nightly clandestine forays removed large segments of the deposits of the ministerial archives.

Acts of Destroying Evidence

The Key Indictment cites at least one case where the then Interior Minister, Talat, enjoins a provincial subaltern to dispose of a cipher sent to him. In the third sitting of the Yozgat trial series, the presiding judge ordered the readings of a portion of chief defendant Kemal's pre-trial interrogatory in which Kemal admits receiving orders from central authorities to burn certain telegrams after reading them. Perhaps the most pungent evidence of postwar orders of destruction of governmental communications and documents "which may fall into the hands of the enemy" is furnished by a postwar Director of Ottoman Post and Telegraph. Refik Halid Karay in his memoirs refers to his predecessor, portrayed as a man who ordered all provincial telegraph bureaus to destroy telegraphic material dealing with Armenian "deportations and massacres."

Consequently the government in April, 1919 ordered the reconstruction, to the extent possible, of certain ciphers affected in this respect. At the June 3, 1919 trial of Cabinet Ministers, ex-Post Minister Hüseyin Haşim conceded having burned all military ciphers on orders of the War Office, and at the June 5 sitting admitted to his issuance of a politically motivated order to destroy records at Çatalca bureau. When Osman, the Director of Çatalca Post and Telegraph Service, was being tried at the Çatalca court-martial, he admitted burning on orders from his superiors all orders dealing with deportations and massacres. The British in their turn intercepted from the Turkish Interior Minister a telegram to the governor of Ayıntab ordering him to burn all originals of official telegrams. This confiscation elicited a formal protest from the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.

A particular type of evidence of destruction involves accounts of rather striking episodes of actual burning of secret documents in the postwar period. This evidence covers the documents on the Special Organization as run by Enver's War Office. It also covers those at the disposal of: (1) Eşref Kuşcubaşı, one of the principal heads of the Organization; (2) Interior Minister and later Grand Vezir Talat; (3) Fourth Army Commander and the so-called Viceroy of Syria and Palestine Cemal Paşa; and (4) Marine Minister in the first Armistice government and Prime Minister in the first Ankara government, Rauf Paşa.

CONFESSIONS OF FORMER CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS

Wartime Cabinet Ministers

These confessions were in part extracted during two major types of preliminary investigations instituted during the Armistice by the Ottoman Parliament on the one hand, and by the Executive relying on courts-martial on the other.

Former Minister of Justice Ibrahim admitted at various junctures of his testimony to the abuses of the law of deportation when answering questions about

"the slaughter and massacre" of deportees. Most importantly, former Grand Vezir Said Halim Paşa underscored the conversion of the orders for deportation into mandates for "killing," among the victims of which included "the innocent Armenian Deputy Zohrab" whose parliamentary immunity was violated. Said Halim attributed "the Armenian massacre" to the willfulness of Ittihad's chief Talat who was obstructing Said Halim's efforts to investigate the matter.

The most noteworthy but indirect confession materializing during the court-martial proceedings attends a document cited in the Key Indictment. In it Special Organization Director and former Minister Dr. Nazim is quoted as saying that the anti-Armenian measures were conceived after prolonged and thorough deliberations, and that they aimed at radically solving the Eastern (Armenian) question. Another Minister and Talat's Deputy in the Interior Ministry, Ali Münif, in a formal letter of protest from Malta where he was being detained for trial, admitted to the perpetration of "the massacre of the Armenians" while disclaiming personal responsibility for it. Still another Minister (Public Works), General Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, who upon Turkey's preemptive intervention in the war had resigned in protest, in a Turkish newspaper in 1918 decried the savagery with which the Armenians were destroyed including the method of stuffing babes in large baskets and drowning them in the Black Sea.

Armistice Period Ministers — Opponents and Critics of Ittihad

Of the Ministers serving in the Armistice period, five stand out in terms of their explicit acknowledgment of the crime of genocide against the Armenians; of these, it must be stressed that three were vehement opponents of Ittihad, belonging as they did to the opposition İtilâf party. Ali Kemal, the Minister of Education and subsequently the Interior Minister, was the most ardent and intrepid of this group, relentlessly advocating the prosecution and punishment of the guilty Ittihadists. Using his editorial position in the Turkish dailies *Sabah*, *Peyam*, and later *Peyam-Sabah*, he blamed not only the Ittihadist chieftains, but the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies and "thousands and thousands" of ordinary people participating in the atrocities.

Another Interior Minister, Cemal, shocked his Turkish compatriots by releasing the 800,000 figure as the number of Armenians "actually killed" during the deportations, insisting that by way of "holding the guilty accountable the government is intent on cleansing the bloody past." Their chief, under whom these ministers served, Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Paşa, defined the Armenian genocide as "a crime that drew the revulsion of the entire humankind."

The other two Ministers, though initially sympathetic or identified with the proclaimed goals of Ittihad, ended up severing their ties with it in dismay. Hüseyin Kâzım (Kadri), twice governor of Saloniki and an ardent ex-Ittihadist, was Minister of Commerce and Agriculture in 1920. He personally observed in Syria his

government's aim of "systematically exterminating" the Armenians. In a book published in 1919, H. Kâzim attributed all the past tribulations associated with "the Armenian question" to "our ignorance and governmental ineptness and tyranny." As to Mustafa Arif, the other Interior Minister (1918-19), he inveighed against his wartime government in the most explicit terms of stricture and condemnation, calling the members of Ittihad's Central committee "bloodthirsty brigands," who succeeded in "exterminating" the Armenians.

The Admissions of the Three Top Ittihadists

Finally, reference may be made to the members of the Ittihadist triumvirate who ushered in the Young Turk revolution, in the process overthrowing the 1876-1908 Abdul Hamid regime, only to have it torn asunder through ten years of governmental ineptness, despotism, and wartime corruption. In a hastily convened meeting between warlord Enver and Abdul Mecid, then second in line to succeed the Sultan to the Ottoman Throne, Enver on the eve of the initiation of the Armenian genocide in the spring of 1915 conceded to Mecid that the exterminatory deportations and massacres were all decided and planned and that nothing could prevent their execution. During an inspection trip to Damascus in 1916, the same Enver in a public speech boasted of having liquidated the Armenians "by the sword." Cemal Paşa for his part acknowledged the destruction of the Armenians in a deportation scheme, claiming that he had no part in it and was not consulted about it. His "revulsion" against the type of massacres perpetrated against the Armenians is tempered, however, by his recourse to the standard Turkish argument that Armenians were likewise guilty, and that 1½ million Turkish war losses easily exceed what he considered the scope of 600,000 Armenian casualties.

The revelations of the arch-Ittihadist Talat, who was also party chief, Interior Minister, and ultimately Grand Vezir, are perhaps the most striking and authoritative. He admitted to three wartime Ambassadors to Turkey, an American and two Germans, that the liquidation of the Armenians was all but completed and that there was no point in raising and discussing any matter respecting them. In his memoirs he acknowledges "the really tragic" details of the Armenian deportations, blaming "provincial officials and the ordinary people [for] this madness." In a wartime exchange with Halide Edib, the renowned Turkish feminist and nationalist writer, Talat is reported by Edib as having underscored his [nationalist] "idealism" when discussing "the extermination of the Armenians."

Army Commanders and Other High-Ranking Military

Foremost among these is Vehib Paşa, an Ittihadist military leader commanding in 1916 the Third Army and in 1918 the Army Group East and, therefore,

intimately familiar with the fate of the Armenian population of the provinces subsumed under Vehib's command and operational zone. In a scathing denunciation of the criminal intent and objectives of his fellow Ittihadists, Vehib in a formal affidavit described the details of the organization and execution of the Armenian genocide, focusing especially on the Central Committee of Ittihad party and the premeditated nature of the crime. Moreover, he himself conducted during the war court-martial proceedings which led to some executions through hanging.

Halil Paşa, the uncle of warlord Enver and the Commander of the Sixth Army, was implicated in the execution of the Armenian officers and soldiers of his units, and the organization of the extermination of the Armenian populations of the provinces of Van and Bitlis. In his memoirs he refers to these measures of destruction, proudly mentioning the figure of "300,000 or more" when estimating the number of his Armenian victims.

Another Turkish general, Ali Ihsan Sabis, Commander of the Fifty-first division, later of the Thirteenth, and then of the Fourth Army Corps of the Third Army, and finally just before the advent of the Armistice of the Sixth Army, is likewise on the record of having boasted to a German officer and to an Armenian bishop of the vast scale of his extermination of the Armenians, at one time frivolously exaggerating the number of his Armenian victims by citing the 500,000 figure.

The military governor of Harput, who functioned also as Interim Governor of the same province, was in charge of the provincial Recruitment or Conscription Bureau (Draft Board). He was accused of the wholesale slaughter of Armenian contingents of labor battalions, consisting of 7,000 men, and of the Armenian populations of Mezre and Harput city. In a pre-trial interrogatory, publicized in the Istanbul press, Faik is quoted as saying that he has in his possession "all the ciphers of Third Army Commander Mahmud Kamil Paşa," ordering "the destruction" (*imha*) of the Armenians. However, at the witness stand of the Military Tribunal he denied having made such statements.

Perhaps the most pungent and specific disclosure about the organization of the massacres against the Armenians comes from the pen of General Ali Fuad Erden, the Chief of Staff of Cemal Paşa's Fourth Army, headquartered in Damascus. Without mincing words, the general recounts the circumstances under which two operatives of the Special Organization came to Aleppo with the objective of organizing the massacre of that region's Armenian population — after having completed "the massacre of the Armenians of Diyarbekir area." General Erden confirms also the role of Dr. B. Şakir in masterminding the over-all scheme of the deportation of the Armenian deportees. The most damning evidence furnished in the memoirs of the general is his scorning of the fact that the deportation of "hundreds of thousands of people was carried out without preparation and organization." The cipher of Dr. Şakir to Cemal Paşa, urging him to direct the deportee convoys to the inhospitable deserts south of Musul, is in this regard most significant about the covert goals of the deportation scheme.

Active and Reserve Officers of Lower Ranks

One of these is Hasan Amca, a career officer of Circassian origin and a member of the anti-Ittihadist Officers' Deliverance group. He had personally observed the atrocities against the Armenians while serving in Syria and Mesopotamia as a member of a Special Commission charged with the task of resettling some contingents of Armenian deportees. Indignant at efforts by some Turkish leaders to exonerate the government, he angrily retorted, "Then who killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians?" and argued that the issue was not deportation but "extermination."

Falih Rifkî (Atay), another Ittihadist, was a Reserve Lieutenant, serving at the headquarters of Cemal Paşa's Fourth Army. In several of his books and articles he consistently describes the anti-Armenian measures as "katliam" (*massacre*), pointing to the organization and organizers of the mass murder, with particular reference to Dr. B. Şakir. In one of those pieces he even refers to "genocide," using exactly this composite Greek-Latin word to characterize the Armenian experience.

One of the most explicit and detailed accounts of the genocide comes from the pen of Major Mehmed Salim, the Commandant of Yozgat barracks (*mevki kumandan*) and the Head of Yozgat's Draft Board. In a comprehensive affidavit prepared at the request of the Turkish Military Tribunal (the Yozgat trial series, February 6-April 7, 1919), the Turkish major narrates the heart-rending details of the atrocities "which are unprecedented in human history" (*tarihi beşeriyetinin kayd etmediği*). Blaming the Ittihadist operatives for the organized carnage, Major Salim narrates scenes of this carnage against victims whose "arms and hands were tied" and who were killed off by mobs armed with "hatchets, knives, sickles, larger axes equipped with hammers, scythes, and other cutting implements."

The revelations of Reserve Captain Ahmed Refik (Altınay), who was assigned duties at Department II of the Ottoman General Headquarters, are even more telling and substantial. Charged with directing the cadres of the Special Organization, the primary killer units deployed at strategic locations in the interior of Turkey, this Department served as the brains trust of the genocide. According to Refik, these cadres were taken to the War Ministry for a week's training at the barracks there, after which they were unleashed "to commit the worst crimes against the Armenians." The overall goal was "the destruction" (*imha*) of the Armenians.

Governors

In his narrations, former governor of Erzurum, Aleppo, and later Konya province, Celal, describes his astonishment when he was told about the real intent of "the deportations," which he observed to be "massacres" carried out under "the most barbaric methods." Former Erzurum governor Hasan Tahsin (Uzer) in public

statements and court appearances testified to the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenians in connection with "deportations," for which he held Third Army Commander Mahmud Kâmil Paşa and Dr. B. Şakir mainly responsible, at the same time indicating that he has documents in his possession to support his charges.

The Ottoman Parliament's Chamber of Deputies

Immediately after the onset of the Armistice, Trabzon Deputy Hafız Mehmet during a debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the Armenian massacres declared that he and other Deputies knew for a long time that the program of exterminating the Armenians was ordained by the government, relying chiefly on the Special Organization for its implementation. Yozgat Deputy Şakir personally testified at the fourth sitting of the Yozgat trial series (February 11, 1919) that the orders for "massacre" were relayed "secretly."

Admissions by Historians, Publicists, and Other Authors

Of these, the long-time Ittihadist editor Yunus Nadi (Ahalioğlu), the founder of *Cumhuriyet*, the Turkish Republic's influential Istanbul daily, is notable for his strong commitments to Ittihadist nationalism, which he transferred after 1920 to the insurgent Kemalist movement. In an editorial in the October 7, 1916 issue of the Turkish newspaper *Tasviri Efkar*, Nadi bluntly declared that the policy of solidarity among the various elements of the Ottoman Empire proved "bankrupt." Focusing on the policy of deportations, Nadi then heralded a policy of "clean-up of the fatherland."

Mehmed Hocoğlu, a chronicler of the history of Turkish-Armenian relations in modern times, candidly declares in his massive volume on the subject that through the implementation of "the deportation" (*tehcir*) scheme, Turkey "settled scores which had been piling up over the years" and thereby "radically solved the reform problem which had become a major headache for the state."

The Columbia University-educated publicist and editor Ahmed Emin (Yalman) in several of his writings, especially his four-volume autobiography, relays the rationale of the resolve of the Ittihadist leaders to destroy the Armenians. He had been a fellow inmate at the detention center at Malta maintained by the British. As explained to him by these Ittihadist chieftains, the density of Armenian populations at the Russian border was considered a great threat to the future of Turkey and, therefore, had to be eliminated at any cost. Dr. B. Şakir was firmly convinced of this. The task of "destruction" was assigned to the Special Organization units.

Reference may also be made to the prolific historian Doğan Avcıoğlu who, in several of his works, unequivocally states that the ultimate aim of the deportations was the final liquidation of the Armenians, for which purpose a particular Special Organization outfit was created under the leadership of Dr. B. Şakir; the resulting units were placed under the command of trusted Ittihadist officers.

Finally, the interjection of a disclosure made by a seemingly well-informed Turkish author may be in order. Being in possession of files containing top secret ciphers between Talat and Cemal, historian Ziya Şakir describes the decision of Talat to get rid of a principal Special Organization officer, Major Ahmed, because he knew too much, and as such was a liability. This arch-executioner of multitudes of Armenians was then hanged in Damascus.

All these admissions, insinuations, attributions of authorship, and expressions of conditional guilt or shame are aptly superseded in import by the stance of Mustafa Kemal, whose adoptive name, Atatürk, symbolizes the primordial evocations modern Turks attach to that name, denoting as it does the idea of "Father of the Turks." In a climate of effervescent nationalism, incompatible with embracing the onus of the crime of mass murder, Atatürk was under even greater restraints in regard to the option of openly and domestically admitting the fact of the Armenian genocide. His exercise of discretion in this connection was, however, less controlled in exchanges and interviews with some foreign dignitaries and journalists, such as Maurice Prax, the correspondent of *Petit Parisien*. In an interview in November, 1918 he lamented the fact that the Allies were so slow in "hanging the rascals Enver, Talat, and Cemal and their accomplices." In a subsequent interview with Swiss journalist Emile Hildebrand (June, 1926), he castigated in the strongest language the Ittihadist leaders for deporting "and massacring millions of our Christian subjects." His most specific acknowledgment of the mass murder of the Armenians by the Ittihadists is recorded by Rauf Orbay, one of his principal cohorts in the War of Independence and the founding of the Turkish Republic. In response to American General Harbord's allusion to the wartime Armenian massacres which he, Harbord, implied had caused the defamation of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, while rejecting the rationale of such a defamation, acknowledged "the massacre by the Turks of 800,000" citizens, at the same time "disapproving the Armenian massacre." The 800,000 figure was issued in March, 1919 as a result of the compilations of the Ottoman Interior Ministry assessing the scope of the victims of the Armenian genocide.

DECLARATIONS OF TWO TURKISH PRESIDENTS

The textual part of this study may be brought to a close by riveting attention on the declarations of two Presidents of the Republic of Turkey, including her principal founder, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), and of one of the most prominent and prodigious historians of that Republic. These declarations, highly visceral in origin and thrust, constitute both a rationale and a guidepost for the cultivation of the abiding Turkish denial syndrome, spanning three-quarters of a century of Turkish indulgence in futile and corrosive self-deception.

The attitude of Mustafa Kemal on this matter, meant to serve the purposes of internal damage control, is brought forth by a Turkish émigré professor, Tahsin Celal. It develops that Ahmed Refik, the prolific Turkish historian who during the war was able to, personally observe the preparations for the Armenian genocide at Department II (intelligence and guerilla warfare) of the Ottoman War Office to which he was assigned as a Reserve Officer, had an altercation with President Mustafa Kemal on the Armenian genocide and on the portions of his book exposing it. The President ordered his book "pulped" and the author banned from public life.

The reaction of another President of the modern Republic of Turkey, Celal Bayar (1950-60), to the public exposure of the crime against the Armenians is on the record, and is direct. Commenting on the revelations in 1919 by Turkish Interior Minister Cemal about 800,000 Armenian victims "killed during the deportations," President Bayar decried them as "the ugliest and most unnecessary manifestation of servility to the victorious Allies." Equally, if not more, significant is the reaction of Bayar, the premier Turkish historian of the modern era. He saw fit to denounce in the same vein the Turkish Minister for furnishing "to our enemies proof and weapons."

Neither the crime of the organized mass killings nor the associated official figure of 800,000 Armenian victims is challenged or in the slightest refuted in these emotive decrials. Instead, a Turkish Interior Minister is stigmatized for disclosing a state secret, with a prominent figure accenting that stigma by injecting religious bigotry in it. Indeed, Süleyman Nazif, wartime provincial governor and postwar editor of the Turkish newspaper *Hadisat*, vented his outrage in this respect by declaring: "This act is unworthy of a Muslim Minister"; he was upset that non-Muslim audiences were made cognizant of the secret and its ramifications.

These facts bespeak volumes regarding the pervasive reality of the genocide at issue and the near-pathetic, if not pathological, endeavors to conceal that reality.

THE DIM PROSPECTS OF FILLING THE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GAPS

There are several reasons for such skepticism. One of them has general prevalence, namely, the inveterate urge of perpetrators to cover as much as possible the tracks of a crime entailing grave consequences for them. Tevfik Çavdar, Talat's biographer, likened Ittihad to "an iceberg," consisting of visible and invisible parts, with Talat relying on the latter as a lever for secret and illegal operations. The internally functioning Special Organization, an offshoot of the original outfit with distinct missions against external foes and state organizations, was structured to suit this type of operation. As C. Kutay repeatedly points out in his numerous writings, the principal task of this branch of the Special Organization was to implement Ittihad's

top-secret designs, involving national goals and aspirations which could not be publicly avowed, much less espoused. These in the main revolved around the supreme objective of eliminating once and for all the discordant nationalities whose recalcitrance to assimilate or integrate in the Ottoman national life had for centuries afflicted the state. The Armenians were the first and primary target in this scheme of coercive homogenizing of Turkey, and given the requisite brutal and barbaric methods, the Ottoman government was by all means to be kept exempt from any responsibility.

At the fifth sitting of the top Ittihadist leaders' trial (May 12, 1919), the existence of this branch of the Special Organization and its involvement in "deportation" operations were conceded by Yusuf Rıza, Trabzon's Responsible Secretary and subsequently a member of Ittihad's Central Committee. Küçük Talat, another such leader, likewise acknowledged the existence of this off-shoot. Captain A. Refik from the intelligence Department of the War Office twice cites in his work the transfer of some of the brigands (*Çetes*) of the Special Organization from the domain of external to that of internal duties, namely, the liquidation of the Armenian deportees. Another contemporary Turkish author, Sina Akşin, states that the exclusion of non-Turks from the high councils of Ittihad was meant to conceal its secret political plans for which it was prepared to commit murder.

Given these circumstances, the insistence on the demand of explicit and conclusive material evidence regarding official decision-making on the Armenian genocide begs the question. This brings up the second reason for skepticism. Not only were records avoided, or at best kept to a bare minimum, but many Cabinet ministers, including the Grand Vezir, were excluded from top-secret deliberations in this regard. The clamor of the revisionists about the absence of respective documents in the *Başbakanlık* Archives is, therefore, a chimerical expedient with transparent purposes. Three 1914 Cabinet Ministers testified before the Ottoman Parliament's Fifth Committee about these irregularities on decision-making and record-keeping. Education Minister and top Ittihadist Ahmed Şükrü admitted, for example, that depending on the importance of the matter, Cabinet decisions were either framed verbally or in writing. Public Work Minister Çürüksulu Mahmud testified that records were not kept on highly controversial or critical decisions. Most important, Grand Vezir Said Halim declared that he was apprised of "the Armenian tragedy" only after it had taken place, and that Talat stubbornly had been concealing from him the details of the crime.

These admissions were corroborated by three postwar Turkish historians. Cemal Kutay maintains, for example, that many vital decisions were made "personally and individually" (*şahsi ve ferdi*), creating "accomplished facts." Being "highly secret decisions, they could not have been entered into the files and archives of the state." Sociologist-historian Ahmed Emin (Yalman) indicates that even party members were kept in the dark about the decisions of the party hierarchy.

Hüseyin Cahid (Yalçın), the noted Ittihadist publicist and editor of the newspaper *Tanin*, Ittihad's mouthpiece, in his memoirs states that the nature and organizers of the Armenian deportations remained a secret; questions raised about them were met with vague answers.

The most authoritative statement in this connection comes from the pen of the late dean of Turkish historians, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. When assessing the availability of documents on wartime Cabinet decisions, he states that "the most important decisions, being secret, were reached among two or three persons. Hence, it is natural (*tabiidir*) that no respective written records be found among the transcripts of the Cabinet Council." This brings up perhaps the most questionable feature of the relevant depositories of the Ottoman Archives purporting to be the ultimate source for the unraveling of the controversies and confusions surrounding the Armenian genocide issue.

The Deceptive Stratagem of Two-Track Orders

It had been long suspected that Interior Minister Talat, who was in charge of the execution of the anti-Armenian measures, developed a system of deceptive communications to conceal the genocidal intent of these measures. His overt orders for "deportation" were not infrequently attended by covert orders of "extermination." The objective was unmistakably clear: to lend not only legitimacy to the introduction of these measures but also the beguiling appearance of benevolence. The deportees were to be protected, fed, and safely transported, and sanctions would be applied to those officials who mistreated the deportees or allowed them to be mistreated by others.

One of Talat's prewar private secretaries in his memoirs disclosed that Talat was wont to indulge in such practices which the author Falih Rıfkı (Atay) decried as "deceptive" and "lying" (*yalan, aldatıcı*). Moreover, at the fourth sitting of the Yozgat trial series (February 11, 1919), that district's Deputy Şakir personally testified that in conjunction with orders of deportation Talat issued "secret" orders of extermination (*imha*). At the fifteenth sitting of the same trial series (March 27, 1919), a district commissioner (*mutasarrıf*) testified to the resort to the same method. Secret wire evidence was introduced at the ninth (February 22, 1919) and twelfth (March 6, 1919) sittings of the same trial series to substantiate the charge of the secret intent of massacre underlying the entire system of deportations. One was from the Boğazhyan county gendarmerie chief, the other was from that county's Recruitment Bureau Chief.

The Key Indictment of the Turkish Military Tribunal cited another piece of evidence in which Talat's plenipotentiary in Aleppo, A. Nuri, is quoted as saying that he "personally received Talat's orders of extermination" (*imha emirlerini bizzat aldım*). *The evidence of this inordinate resort to lethal cunning, dominating the entire enterprise of "Armenian deportations," is hardly expected to be documented in the much heralded, but possibly reconstituted Başbakanlık Archives.*

The total absence of such documentary evidence was precisely the intent and goal of the authors of the genocide. Only a lapse into naivety, whether intentional or innocent, can still drive some people to insist on the reliability and authenticity of the respective holdings of the Ottoman Archives.

That such deceptiveness and lethal cunning is part of the Ottoman legacy is evidenced in a recent discovery of a pair of documents integrated in the massive compilation of Turkish General Kâzım Karabekir's volume documenting the Kemalist War of Independence from 1920 to 1923. On November 8, 1920, the Ankara government issued two cipher telegrams. One of them instructed the General to be amicable with the representatives of the defeated Armenian Republic whose untrained, inexperienced, and fledgling Army had succumbed to Karabekir's military invasion of Armenia. He is told to promise the Armenian officials friendship, economic assistance, and food supplies to avert famine in Armenia. The other and "secret" cipher, however, enjoins the General to undertake all the necessary measures to achieve "the political and physical elimination of Armenia" (*Ermenistani siyaseten ve maddeten ortadan kaldırmak*). He is advised to be circumspect and gradual in the pursuit of this goal which "reflects the real intent of the Cabinet" (*makasidi hakikiye*). Most significant, the General is told to employ all available means in order to lull the victims which may be achieved by "deceiving (*iğfal*) the Armenians and fooling the Europeans" who are concerned with their fate.

A Turkish career officer in opposition to İttihad, Hasan Amca, was impatient with Turkish efforts to define the Armenian tragedy as a mere by-product of a justified deportation plan, and indignantly, if not cogently stated: "Forget the terms 'deportations, 'massacres,' and say 'the decision to exterminate the Armenians,' " only to conclude that "This country doesn't have the guts to face the truth." In more recent years, this "gutlessness" is peculiarly expressed in a July 1, 1983 circular of the Public Education Ministry of the Turkish Republic forbidding the use of the words "Armenia," and its Turkish counterpart, "Ermenistan," in historical atlases. In December 1986, the publisher of a Turkish edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* confronted charges of weakening Turkish national sentiment because the work refers to the existence of an Armenian state in southern Anatolia in the eleventh century.

The pervasiveness and persistence of this denial syndrome is articulated by British author David Hotham, who in the 1960s spent eight years in the capital of Turkey as the *London Times*' correspondent and is fluent in Turkish: "... all Turks, so far as I have been able to judge, are adamant on the Armenian question. No Turk I have ever met, however sophisticated, westernized, or however well I personally knew him, has ever in my hearing shown a sense of guilt about the fate of the Armenians; divided on most other questions, the Turks seem united on this." (For the full text and source of this statement see "The Emergence of Denial as a Cultural Imperative" section of the Bibliography).

As indicated in the Introduction of this chapter, the bibliographical gaps are reflective of both an awareness of the gravity of the crime needing to be covered up, and the enormity of the responsibility attached to the scheming and implementation of that crime.

Further, the genocidal conspiracy is extended in the aftermath of the crime, by way of a conspiracy of silence or reticence. The topic is made to subside and is eventually consigned the status of a sensitive and even forbidden subject-matter. Hence, reactions to departure from this pattern are vehement and at times truculent; as such they too are made part of the bibliography, as will be noted below. *Suppression thus becomes an integral part of the denial syndrome.*

The emergence of this post-crime pattern is largely, if not exclusively, accountable by postwar political developments allowing Turkey, as the only defeated enemy in World War I, to negotiate the terms of the peace settlement. By exploiting the internal feuds of the victors and organizing an insurgency in the interior of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was able to convert military defeat into a regional military victory. The ensuing Lausanne Treaty in 1923, most of whose terms were virtually imposed by the Turks upon a collection of weary, discordant, and opportunistic diplomats representing the victorious Allies, allowed the issue of war crimes, including the Armenian genocide, to be brushed aside. This fact, plus the change of regime marking the advent of the modern Republic of Turkey, provided the Turks the impetus, if not the license, to dismiss the historical fact of the Armenian genocide as fabrication, and to cast aspersion upon the corpus of evidence as originating from partisan and biased sources. Their relative success, keynoted by the increase of the use of the qualifier "alleged" by ill-informed representatives of the media and politicians referring to the Armenian genocide in a perfunctory way, once more brings into relief the preponderance of leverage enjoyed by a powerful party facing a weak or impotent adversary. The situation is aggravated even more when one considers that the adversary, i.e., the Armenians, is deprived of the minimal resources embodied in the organization of a sovereign state.

To conclude, the residual Turkish documents and the sporadic and scattered testimonies of high-ranking Turkish military and civilian officials, in public fora and in published memoirs, possess extraordinary value given the impediments described above. The authenticity of these Turkish sources is incontestable as those subject to dispute, such as the Naim-Andonian dossier containing the highly incriminating ciphers of Talat, the architect of the Armenian genocide, have been left out only for the purposes of this study, which is to obviate excuses for disputation. The Turkish sources and data marshalled and integrated in the present study demonstrate once more that suppression of evidence not only has its own limitations but is intrinsically risky as far as the potential of discovery is concerned. The findings of this study serve to vindicate the credo of scholarship that the essentials of truth cannot be overpowered for too long, irrespective of the magnitude of the resources applied for that end.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

As outlined in the Introduction of this chapter, the present case of genocide is, bibliographically speaking, handicapped. The resulting constraints require appropriate adjustments in the scheme of listing works in pertinent Turkish literature which document that genocide at various levels and in different respects. These works cover the entire span of postwar Ottoman-Turkish history of which the 1918-20 Armistice period represents the inception of a short-lived Turkish legal effort of documenting the crime. Accordingly, certain portions of the Bibliography will comprise substantive excerpts from legal documents marshalled by the Turkish courts-martial. Where such material is wanting or missing, as far as *Takvimi Vekayi* (the official gazette of the Turkish government whose supplements served as a judicial journal recording major parts of the proceedings) is concerned, it will be necessary to have recourse to (1) other organs of the Istanbul press covering the same proceedings, and (2) the archive of the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate holding a vast corpus of copies of documents associated with the courts-martial.

Finally, other portions of the Bibliography, involving articles and books by Turkish authors, will be spotlighted by fragments depicted from these works. The rationale for this selective and truncated representation issues from the prohibitive and in some respects even ominous climate of governmental sanctions and oppressive public opinion in Turkey, past and present, in so far as a free debate of the Armenian question is concerned. Consequently, one has to content oneself with the availability of brief and caustic forays by Turkish authors into the forbidden realm, sometimes with furtive, other times with implicit admissions of guilt, and occasionally with insinuations of a sense of shame.

The Problems of Deflection and of Missing and Waning Documents

ACTS OF AVOIDING MATERIAL EVIDENCE (THROUGH CONCEALMENT OF GENOCIDAL INTENT)

Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive:

At the 9th sitting of the Yozgat trial series (22 February 1919) Boğazlıyan military chief Mustafa's wire was introduced in which he declared that his reference to "deportation" (*sevkiyat*) meant that the Armenian deportees were "murdered" (*katl edilidikleri*). Archive series 17, file Ho, doc. Nos. 511, 592. [Istanbul press accounts of the sitting are in *Ikdam*, *Renaissance*, 23 February 1919.] At the 12th sitting (6 March 1919) a wire by Hulusi, the gendarmerie commander of the same city, was introduced in which he is reporting that Armenians have been "deported, namely, were annihilated" (*sevkiyat yani mahv manasına*). Archive series 21, file M, doc. Nos. 298, 324, 506. At the 11th sitting (5 March 1919), former governor of Yozgat Cemal personally testified that he was barred from seeing a hand-written note written in the secret notebook of Necati, the area's Responsible Secretary. Necati was demanding that he, Cemal, proceed with organizing the massacre of the deportee convoys. Cemal refused and was relieved of his post within two weeks following his refusal. [Istanbul press account is in *Renaissance*, 16 March 1919.]

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3540, 28 April 1919 sitting, publication date 5 May 1919.

pp. 4-5. The Court repeatedly cites in its Key Indictment the resort by the perpetrators to "oral and secret instructions" to implement the massacres (*talimatı şifahiye ve mahremaniye; şifahi ve hafi evamir ve talimat itası*).

p.6. A cipher telegram by Dr. B. Şakir who is asking Harput province's Responsible Secretary Resneli Nazim whether the Armenians are being "liquidated and destroyed" (*tasfiye ve imha*), or are merely being deported. This cipher was reintroduced at the Responsible Secretaries trial series in the verdict of which the Court underlined the real intent of the anti-Armenian measures as being "destruction and annihilation" (*ifna ve imha*). [Referenced also in *Takvimi Vekayi*, No. 3772, p. 4]

p.8. The Court mentions the discharging of two governors for refusing to comply with orders for massacre, namely, Celal of Aleppo and Mazhar of Ankara province, who refused to go beyond deportation; there is also the mention of two lower-rank governors who were ambushed and murdered because they refused to organize massacres without written orders.

No.3616, Trabzon verdict, 22 May 1919, publication date 6 August 1919.

p.1. "The massacre and destruction (*taktıl ve ifna*) of the Armenians was executed through secret orders by men who ostensibly had the assignment to implement the law of deportation" (*zahiren tehcir kanununu tatbik etmek*).

No.3617, Yozgat verdict, 8 April 1919, publication date 7 August 1919.

p. 2. "The documents, personally signed by the defendants, confirm the fact that the gendarmes escorted the deportee convoys for the purpose of massacre. There can be no doubt and hesitation about this" (*maksadı taktili olduğundan şüphe ve tereddüt bırakmadığından*).

ACTS OF REMOVAL OF EVIDENCE

British Foreign Office Archives. F0371/4172/31307, folio 385.

On 10 February 1919 British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe relays to London the copy of a document secured through the mediation of a British intelligence agent in which a Turkish Public Security official in charge of Interior Ministry's wartime archives declares: "Just before the Armistice, officials had been going to the archives department at night and making a clean sweep of most of the documents."

German Foreign Ministry Archives. AA. Türkei 158/21, A48179.

On 6 November 1918 Turkish, Grand Vezir Izzet Paşa lodged a protest to Berlin against German General von Seeckt, the last wartime Chief of Staff at Ottoman General Headquarters, for carrying away with him "*tous les dossiers du Quartier Général Ottoman, malgré sa promesse formelle de ne pas emporter ces pièces qui sont la propriété du Gouvernement. . .*" [A Turkish source confirms this removal (pp. 435-437). Çavdar, Tefvik (1984). Talat Paşa. Ankara: Dost publications. 512 pp. On 24 November 1919 Berlin promised to return those documents relevant to Turkey.

Istanbul press:

Nor Giank, 29 January 1919.

Interim Interior Minister Ahmet Izzet (Kambur) in an interview stated that "the documents proving the guilt of the Ittihadists have been made to disappear by the Ittihadists themselves. For this reason we are having recourse to special courts-martial where inner conviction and testimony may serve as a kind of substitute for probative evidence."

Tunaya, T.Z. (1986). *Türkiyede siyasal partiler* (Political parties in Turkey), Vol. 2, 2nd enlarged ed. Istanbul: Hurriyet Vakfi publications. 694 pp.

p. 96, n. 16. Relying on Ittihad's Secretary-General Midhat's testimony before the Independence Court, Tunaya states: "The documents of the Ittihad party were crammed into a suitcase by Dr. Behaeddin Şakir after they had been removed from the party headquarters by Dr. Nazim. The suitcase was then taken to the home of attorney Ramiz, Şakir's brother-in-law." [The accuracy of Midhat Şükri's further statement, made in 1926, and likewise quoted by author Tunaya, that out of fear Ramiz then destroyed the documents, is belied by the revelations of the Turkish press in December 1918 when Turkish police raided the home of Ramiz, found, impounded, and handed these documents over to the court-martial. *Akşam*, 12 December 1918; *Tasviri Efkâr*. 13 December 1918.]

ACTS OF DESTROYING EVIDENCE

Atay, F.R. (1980). *Çankaya*. Istanbul: Sena. 586 pp.

pp. 127-128. During the war the author was IVth Army Commander and (at the same time as being Marine Minister) Cemal Paşa's personal secretary and his Private Bureau's Deputy Director. He states that before Cemal's flight from Istanbul ". . . some of his files [containing] official documents were left in the custody of Seyfi, one of his men, who out of fear burned them."

Aydemir, Ş.S. (1972). *Makedonyadan Ortaasyaya Enver Paşa*. (Enver Paşa: from Macedonia to Central Asia), Vol. 3, 1914-1922. Istanbul: Remzi. 696 pp.

p. 493. "Before the flight of the top Ittihadist leaders, Talat Paşa stopped by at the waterfront residence of one of his friends on the shore of Arnavudköy, depositing there a suitcase of documents. It is said that the documents were burned in the basement's furnace. Indeed . . . the documents and other papers of Ittihad's Central Committee are nowhere to be found."

British Foreign Office Archives.

F0371/4174/15450.

folio 182. On 24 January 1919 the General Headquarters of the British Army's Egyptian Expeditionary Force intercepted the following telegram from the Turkish Interior Minister to the provincial governor at Ayıntab, a city located east of Adana: "Burn originals of official telegrams since mobilization on files of district."

F0371/4174/102551.

folios 108-111. On 17 June 1919 Turkish Foreign Minister Safa sent a verbal note to the British High Commissioner protesting the seizure for purposes of examination by a British officer of official papers in the charge of the governor of Ayıntab. In that note, the Foreign Minister reveals that the Diyarbakir-based Director of Telegraphic Service sent a circular telegram ordering his provincial subordinates to destroy the originals of all antecedent [1914-18] wires. When explaining that attitude to London, Admiral Calthorpe directed "attention to the tenor of this note which treats as a mere matter of office routine such an important matter as the proposed destruction of documents relating to the period of deportations, massacres, and the activities of the Turkish authorities during the war." He also invoked "the principle that the civil functionaries in occupied territory are bound to comply with the instructions of the occupying Military Authorities" (folio 110). [The British War Office for its part advised the Headquarters in Egypt that under paragraphs 374 and 406, part 1, Manual of Military Law, "you are entitled to confiscate wartime records" (F0371/4172/15450).] Finally, British Foreign Affairs Minister Curzon on 17 July 1919 appended the following in the margins on the last page of the respective official correspondence, "I approve your attitude in this matter" (folio 111).

F0371/5166/E1782, Reports 575, 592.

folio 33. In its weekly summary of intelligence reports, dated 4 March 1920, the British Military Intelligence bureau, M.I.I.c., addressed the problem of "the disappearance of documents incriminating" a number of Ittihadists and nationalists. Focusing on a statement made by Rauf (Orbay), Turkish naval war hero, Minister of Marine 1918, and Prime Minister 1922-23, the report (p. 2) states, "he urged the destruction of incriminating documents. It is understood that Rauf had already arranged the disappearance of documentary material implicating himself and Enver Paşa."

Ertürk, H. (1957). *2 Devrin perde arkası* (Behind the scenes in two eras). Edited by S.N. Tansu. Istanbul: Hilmi Publishers. 572 pp.

pp. 216, 220, 274. The author was involved in the organization of the Special Organization cadres during the war and was entrusted by War Minister Enver with the task of overseeing the interests of the organization following the escape from Istanbul of the top leaders of Ittihad. He was to carry out that mission under the nose of Allied occupation forces. The pertinent records at the disposal of Enver were first removed to a house surrounded by vast vegetable gardens at Topkapı and later incinerated by the pharmacist proprietor Ahmed.

Karay, R.H. (1964). *Minelbab lelmihrab* (From end to end), Istanbul: Inkilâp and Aka publishers. 230 pp.

p. 221. In 1919 the author was General Director of Telegraphic Service of Turkey, a post analogous to that of a Minister. He reproduces in his biographical volume a statement by H. Sadık Durukal indicating that Karay's predecessor, Mehmet Emin, had sent official telegraphic orders to all principal telegraph centers of the country, directing them to "destroy all official papers, the originals and copies of all telegrams." The author is commended by Durukal for rescuing his predecessor from the clutches of the Turkish Military Tribunal by personal intervention. As Karay avers, the Tribunal considered the documents, which were ordered to be destroyed, as incriminating evidence relative to the Armenian "deportations and massacres" (*tehcir ve taktıl*).

Stoddard, Philip H. (1963). *The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkitât-i Mahsusa*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms. 245 pp.

p. 229. ". . . the agents and headquarter units [of the Special Organization], in compliance with Enver Paşa's standing orders, destroyed the papers they were carrying..."

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3573, 3 June 1919 sitting, publication date 12 June 1919.

pp. 141-148. During that sitting, former Post Minister Huseyin Haçim admitted to ordering "all military telegrams burned on orders from the War Office." In his testimony on the witness stand he declared that "The Interior Minister is responsible for the crimes." [Istanbul press accounts are in *Le Bosphore*, *Moniteur Oriental*, 4 June 1919.]

Istanbul press:

Moniteur Oriental, 6 June 1919.

Reproduces the exchange between the president of the court martial and former Minister of Post Haşim at the Çatalca Court Martial about the latter's rationale for ordering destruction of all postal and telegraphic documents at Çatalca station. Haşim admitted that the order was given for political or military necessity. [When at the same trial the defendant, Osman, the Director of the Çatalca postal station, was asked the same question, he confessed to the fact that the order was meant for the documents dealing with deportation and massacre. *Jhogovourt*, 6 August 1919.]

Renaissance, 11 and 12 February 1919.

At the 3rd sitting of the Yozgat trial series (10 February 1919) the presiding judge ordered the reading of a portion of chief defendant Kemal's pre-trial interrogatory in which he had admitted receiving orders from the central authorities to burn certain telegrams after reading them. This act was repeated at the 13th sitting (24 March 1919). [See also *İstiklâl*, 25 March 1919.]

Le Courrier de Turquie, 4 April 1919.

Reports a governmental attempt to have all coded telegrams, which were destroyed but which were "relative to the massacres," reconstituted and to have them dispatched to the Ottoman capital. Appropriate orders have been sent to "all telegraphic and administrative bureaus."

Confessions of Former Civilian and Military Officials

WARTIME CABINET MINISTERS

British Foreign Office, F0371/5091/E14130.

folio 32. On 19 October 1920 former Public Works Minister and Undersecretary in Talat's Ministry of Interior, Ali Munif, formally petitioned the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for immediate trial or, in the absence of charges, for immediate release. In pleading not guilty for anything, he stated, "As to the massacres, which took place in 1915, I was not in position at that time neither to decree nor to commit, directly or indirectly these acts. Consequently, I cannot be held responsible for them, neither as a decreeing power, nor as an executing capacity."

Gökbilgin, Tayyib M. (1959). *Milli mücadele başlarken* (As the national struggle began), Vol. 1. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society. 195 pp.

P.55. Refers to Interior Minister Cemal's declaration that "the nation is entitled to an account on the bloody past," i.e., İttihad's legacy of war, mass murder, and economic crimes; in the same vein Cemal indicated "the government's resolve to deal with that past speedily in order to cleanse it" (*kanlı maziyi temizleyecektir*).

Istanbul press:

Alemdar, *İkdam*, *Vakit*, 15 March 1919; *Le Moniteur Oriental*, 13 March 1919.

Articles and editorials on Interior Minister Cemal's public declaration that according to the statistics compiled at the Interior Ministry, "800,000 Armenians were killed in

the course of the deportations." This figure is exclusive of tens of thousands of Armenian conscripts killed by fellow soldiers and officers while serving in the Turkish army during the war, the countless young girls and women forced into concubinage or harems, and multitudes of Armenian orphans collected and raised as Muslims and Turks. [Turkish historian Bayur in his last volume indicates that the 800,000 figure more or less jibes with subsequent figures computed by Turkish authorities (p. 787). Bayur, Y.H. (1983). *Türk inkilâbü tarihi* (The History of the Turkish Revolution), Vol. 3 (4). Ankara: Turkish Historical Society. 878 pp.]

Nor Giank, 7 November 1918. Original source *Vakit*. General's memoirs.

General Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, Deputy War Minister 1913, Public Works Minister 1914, Minister without portfolio 1919, and Senator in the Ottoman Parliament, in his memoirs relates exchanges with Berlin Ambassador and former Grand Vezir Hakki Paşa and Deputies Abdullah Azmi (Kütahya) and Salah Cimcoz (Istanbul). The gist of these conversations, as put forth by the General, is that not "the Turkish people but the government is implicated in this crime which included the drowning of infants jammed in baskets."

Harb kabinelerinin istievabı, 16 November-19 December 1918 (Wartime cabinet ministers' hearings) (1933) [Special supplement No. 2 of the Turkish newspaper *Vakit* carrying excerpts from the hearings conducted by the Fifth Committee of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies. Istanbul: *Vakit* 620 pp.]

1. Excerpts from the testimony of Ex-Justice Minister Ibrahim,

pp. 516-519. In response to the statement of the Chairman of the Parliamentary Fifth Committee investigating wartime ministerial "misconduct" that the deportation law was "contrary to the spirit of humanity," and to the ancillary statement by a Deputy member that the law degenerated into a license for "slaughter of human beings," Ibrahim maintained that these "excesses were committed without the knowledge of the government."

p. 526. "I believe that even though the Deputies were quite aware of these misdeeds and atrocities none of them appealed to us or warned us."
2. Excerpts from the testimony of Ex-Grand Vezir Said Halim:

pp. 290-291. Referring to the deportations degenerating into a campaign for extermination. "You can't interpret the order to 'deport' as order to 'kill' . . . as in other instances, I heard about this tragedy when it was all over."

pp. 293-294. In response to another question, Said Halim in one single paragraph defined the anti-Armenian measures as "Armenian massacres," entirely dropping the twin term "deportation." He depicted Talat as the arch-villain, obstructing every effort to investigate the matter, concluding that in order for such an investigation to be genuine and judicious, it had to be deferred until the end of the war.

pp. 295-296. Lamenting "the tragedy of Zohrab, this innocent man," [an Armenian Deputy who was assassinated by Special Organization agents, along with Vartkes, another Armenian Deputy], Said Halim scorned the indifference in the Parliament, and continued: "I intoned 'What is this? By what law are you doing such a thing?' I received no answer." [World War I Austrian Ambassador to Turkey, Pallavicini, in two reports to Vienna relays portions of exchanges with the Ottoman Grand Vezir, confirming the latter's postwar statements cited above. On 7 November 1915 (the anniversary of the formal start of war with Russia), in a cipher marked "very confidential" (*streng vertraulich*), Pallavicini declared that Said Halim disagrees with Talat's Armenian policy and does not condone "the penchant for creating a national (homogenous) state by way of destroying the alien elements" (*die Tendenz einen*

nationalen Staat durch Vernichtung der fremden Elemente w schaffen). *Austrian Foreign Ministry Archives*. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv. Haus und Hof. Vienna. Abteilung I. Allgemeines. (Karton Rot) 944. Allgemeines 1915 V-XII. No. 93, A-E.

In a 10 March 1916 report Pallavicini decried the Turkish practice of transforming deportations into a campaign of destruction of the Armenian nation as "a perennial stain for the Turkish government" (*wird immer ein Schandfleck für die türkische Regierung bleiben*). He then added this remark: "A few days ago the grand Vezir candidly stated that from the very start he was against the anti-Armenian measures as primarily conceived by Talat and Enver." *Austrian Foreign Ministry Archives* XII. Türkei 3) Die Armenier Verfolgungen 1915-1918. Karton 463. No. 21/P.B. The Ambassador makes a similar attribution to Turkish Foreign Minister Halil in the same report, as well as in a 7 November 1915 report in which Pallavicini declares that "Halil with complete candor conceded that his colleague Talat is bent on solving the Armenian question, while the war is on, in his own fashion and on creating for the Powers an accomplished fact . . . the governors of provinces and districts are Ittihadist party men are obeying only the orders originating from the party, but not those issued by the government." *Austrian Foreign Ministry Archives* XII. Türkei. 3) Die Armenier Verfolgungen 1915-1918. Karton 463. No. 93/P.B.]

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3540, 28 April 1919 sitting, publication date 5 May 1919.

p. 8. Dr. Nazım, one of the chief organizers of the genocide, is described as admonishing recalcitrant Konya governor Celal with the words, "The anti-Armenian measures were determined upon following extensive and thorough deliberations by the Central Committee. [They are intended to] solve the Eastern Question."

ARMISTICE PERIOD MINISTERS - OPPONENTS AND CRITICS OF ITTIHAD

German Foreign Ministry Archives. A.A. Botschaft Konstantinopel 172 No. 384. German Damascus Consul Loytved Hardegg's 30 May 1916 report.

This report concerns a confidential conversation with Hüseyin Kâzım Kadri, Armistice period Minister of Commerce, Agriculture and Public Works (1920-21), during which the latter is described as having "realized that the Turkish government is not serious about deportations but is actually aiming at the systematic extermination" (*systematisch ausrotten*) of the Armenian deportees. The exchange was initiated by Kadri during a banquet given by Cemal Paşa under whom Kadri then was serving as Relocation officer, involved with the settlement of the Armenian deportees.

Istanbul press:

Sabah, 28 January 1919. Editorial by Ali Kemal, Minister of Education (4 March-19 May 1919) and Interior Minister (19 May-29 June 1919).

"Four or five years ago a historically singular crime has been perpetrated, a crime before which the world shudders. Given its dimensions and standards, its authors do not number in the fives, or tens, but in the hundreds of thousands . . . In fact, it has already been demonstrated that this tragedy was planned on the basis of a decision reached by the Central Committee of Ittihad." [Another editorial in *Alımdar*, 18 July 1919, said that ". . . our Minister of Justice has opened the doors of prisons Don't let us try to throw the blame on the Armenians; we must not flatter ourselves that the world is peopled with idiots. We have plundered the possessions of the men whom we deported and massacred; we have sanctioned theft in our Chamber and our Senate . . . Let us prove that we have sufficient national energy to put the law into force against the heads of these bands who have trampled justice underfoot and dragged our honor and our national life through the dust."]

Vakit, 13 December 1918. Statement by Interior Minister Mustafa Arif (Deymer).

"Surely a few Armenians aided and abetted our enemy, and a few Armenian Deputies committed crimes against the Turkish nation . . . it is incumbent upon a government to pursue only the guilty ones. Unfortunately, our wartime leaders, imbued with a spirit of brigandage, carried out the law of deportation in a manner that could surpass the proclivities of the most bloodthirsty bandits. They decided to exterminate the Armenians, and they did exterminate them. This decision was taken by the Central Committee of the Young Turks and was implemented by the government." Eight days later, on 21 December, the same Interior Minister declared in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies: "The atrocities committed against the Armenians reduced our country to a gigantic slaughterhouse." He made this statement after he had finished reading the Sultan's Imperial Edict which ordered the dissolution of the Chamber as provided by the Constitution. *Renaissance*, 11 December 1918.

Türkgeldi, Fuad Ali (1951). *Görüp işittiklerim* (The things I saw and heard), 2nd ed. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society publication. 290 pp. Statement by Grand Vezir Damad Ferid Paşa.

p. 197. "It is necessary to speedily adopt a decision regarding the authors of a crime which drew the revulsion of the entire humankind."

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3909, 21 July 1920. Cemal, Interior Minister (March-April 1919), Interim Interior Minister (July 1920).

His ministry's computation of the number of Armenians killed during the deportations is given as 800,000, with Cemal posing the question, "Don't you think that the nation is entitled to get an account of the atrocities? ... The bloody past will be expunged." [Cited also on p. 55 of Gökbilgin, T.M. (1951) (see p. 107, this chapter, "Confessions of Former Civilian and Military Officials") and in the Istanbul press as below.]

Istanbul press:

Vakit, *İkdam*, 15 March 1919; *Alemdar*, 13 March 1919.

Interior Minister Cemal's public declaration that on the basis of computations undertaken by Ministry experts "800,000 Armenian deportees were actually killed."

THE ADMISSIONS OF THE THREE TOP İTTİHADISTS (WARTIME MINISTERS)

Given the heavy burdens of responsibility devolving upon these three leaders concerning the enormity of the crime of the Armenian genocide, a responsibility compounded and aggravated by the defeat of Turkey in October 1918, statements made by them during the Armistice period had to be crafted with utmost caution and circumspection. Therefore, the available respective accounts and references to the anti-Armenian measures are primarily simplified versions of a Turko-Armenian conflict, exacerbated by the emergencies and exigencies of a global war. Turkey is portrayed as having fought a life-and-death struggle, and the Armenians are defined as treacherous and seditious internal foes, endeavoring to tilt that struggle towards the scales of a death struggle. Notwithstanding, the contours of an exterminatory thrust are discernible in the application of these anti-Armenian measures, as conceded and justified by all these men.

There is a clear penchant in the postwar statements of all three to disclaim responsibility for the genocidal outcome of these measures. Their wartime declarations, reflecting as they do a mood of confidence in victory, are, however, less defensive and ambivalent, suggesting a sense of gratification at the accomplished results. In order to obviate possible arguments of prejudice and bias, the citations have been confined to authors and personalities who were either neutral during the exchanges with the three men, or were avowed friends of Turkey. Excluded are such people as Lepsius who had a lengthy interview with Enver during the war regarding the then unfolding Armenian massacres. In the case of declarations, however, which have a public character, such as speeches made during public ceremonies, the condition of the source being neutral or pro-Turkish is vitiated.

Cemal Paşa

Cemal Paşa (1977). *Hatıralar: İttihad ve Terakki I. dünya savaşı anıları* (Memoirs of World War I: recollections about İttihad ve Terakki), 4th ed. Edited by B. Cemal Istanbul: Çağdas. 465 pp. [It is noted at the end of the book that Cemal did not and could not reveal everything due to the constraints of the Armistice period.]

p. 413. Alluding to the severity of anti-Armenian measures and the participation by people in their implementation, "I find the perpetration of massacres particularly revolting" (*hususiyile katliamlardan nefret ederim*).

p. 443. "The crimes which reportedly were perpetrated during the 1915 deportations are really revolting."

Kressenstein, Freiherr Kress von (1938). *Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal* (To the Suez Canal with the Turks). Berlin: Vorhut Verlag. 308 pp. (Lieutenant Colonel, later Major General, staff officer, later army commander, serving under the Turkish High Command in Palestine during World War II)

p. 140. Returning to Istanbul War Office from his IVth Army Headquarters in the company of the German officer, Cemal in Mamure witnessed deportation scenes which were sufficiently revolting for him to turn to his German companion and remark, "I am ashamed of my nation" (*Ich schäme mich für meine Nation*).

Enver Paşa

The Morning Post, 1 December 1918. Prince Abdul Mecid, Heir-Apparent to the Ottoman Throne, in an interview with the Istanbul Special Correspondent of this London daily.

p. 5. "I refer to those awful massacres. They are the greatest stain that has ever disgraced our nation and race. They were entirely the work of Talaat and Enver. I heard some days before they began that they were intended. I went to Istanbul and insisted on seeing Enver. I asked him if it was true that they intended to recommence the massacres which had been our shame and disgrace under Abdul Hamid. The only reply I could get from him was: 'It is decided. It is the programme.'" Quoted also in *New York Times*, 27 November 1918, from a similar interview by an Associated Press reporter.

French Foreign Ministry Archives Guerre 1914-1918. Turquie. Vol. 872. Cipher No. 165. French Ambassador to Egypt Defrance to French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand. 19 May 1916.

Enver publicly declared: "The Ottoman Empire should be cleaned up of the Armenians and the Lebanese. We have destroyed the former by the sword, we shall destroy the latter through starvation." (Quoted in Beylerian, A. (1983). *Les grandes puissances, l'empire Ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives françaises (1914-1918)*. Paris: Sorbonne. Documentary Series No. 34. p. 205.]

Morgenthau, Henry (1918). *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page. 407 pp.

pp. 351-352. The American Ambassador was deploring "the massacres" against the Armenians and attributing them to irresponsible subalterns and underlings in the distant provinces. Enver's retort was: "You are greatly mistaken. We have this country absolutely under our control. I have no desire to shift the blame on to our underlings and I am entirely willing to accept the responsibility myself for everything that has taken place."

Talat Paşa

German Foreign Ministry Archives A.A. Türkei 183/37, A19744.

In a conversation with Dr. Mordtmann, the dragoman of the German Embassy in Istanbul and the man in charge of that embassy's Armenian desk. Ambassador Wangenheim's 17 June 1915 report to Berlin quoting Talat as follows: "Turkey is intent on taking advantage of the war in order to thoroughly liquidate (gründlich aufzuräudumen) its internal foes, i.e., the indigenous Christians, without being thereby disturbed by foreign intervention."

Memoirs of Count Bernstorff (1936). Translated by Eric Sutton. New York: Random House. 383 pp.

p. 176. In 1918, three years after the above-quoted report, Talat in an exchange with Bernstorff, the last German Ambassador to Turkey, indicated that the genocide was all but completed, as revealed in this excerpt from the Ambassador's memoirs: "When I kept on pestering him on the Armenian Question, he once said with a smile, 'What on earth do you want? The question is settled. There are no more Armenians.' "Added the Ambassador, "In Armenia . . . the Turks have been systematically trying to exterminate the Christian population." p. 374.

Morgenthau, Henry (1918). *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page. 407

pp. 333-334. Talat to Morgenthau: "Why can't you let us do with these Christians as we please?"

p. 337. Talat to Morgenthau: "It is no use for you to argue, we have already disposed of three quarters of the Armenians . . . The hatred between the Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with them. If we don't they will plan their revenge."

p. 339. "No Armenian can be our friend after what we have done to them."

p. 392. "What's the use of speaking about them? We are through with them. That's all over."

German Foreign Ministry Archives A.A. Türkei 158/14.

p. 18. The 18 October 1915 report by Ernst Jackh, the Turkophile German specialist of Turkey, on his September-October 1915 trip, which was prepared for the benefit of the German Foreign Office, contained these words: "Indeed Talat openly hailed the destruction of the Armenian people as a political relief."

Trumpener, Ulrich. (1968). *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 433 pp.

p. 127. Hans Humann, Lieutenant Commander, German Naval Attaché, Istanbul Embassy, and warlord Enver's crony, forwarded to Berlin "a memorandum by Talat and Enver in which they demanded Wolff-Metternich's (German Ambassador to Turkey) immediate replacement. In listing their objections to the Ambassador, both Turks emphasized that he

was totally devoid of sympathy for the innovation which the *İttihad ve Terakki* regime was introducing in the Ottoman Empire, a charge which referred quite obviously to Wolff-Metternich's opposition to the Porte's Armenian policies. As Talat put it, 'the work that is to be done must be done *now*; after the war it will be too late'" (italics in the original).

Edib, Halide (1926). *Memoirs of Halide Edib*. New York: Century. 472 pp.

p. 387. During an exchange with Talat on "the Armenian question" and the "factors which lead man to the extermination of his kind," Edib discerns "two factors . . . the principles advocated by the idealists, and the material interest which the consequences of doing so afford certain classes. The idealists are the more dangerous, for one is obliged to respect them even if one cannot agree with them. Talat was of that kind." The Turkish feminist writer then quotes Talat directly: "I have the conviction that as long as a nation does the best for its own interests, and succeeds, the world admires it and thinks it moral. I am ready to die for what I have done, and I know that I shall die for it."

Herbert, Aubrey [Captain J.G. Bennett] (1924). *Ben Kəndint. A Record of Eastern Travel*, 2nd ed. Edited by D. MacCarthy. London: Hutchinson. 343 pp.

p. 309. In an exchange with this Turkophile British Member of Parliament who went to see Talat in exile in Germany under the auspices of Scotland Yard, Talat portrayed himself as being "against the attempted extermination of the Armenians."

p. 323. Talat also claimed that "He had twice opposed enforced migration." [These excerpts, from an interview requested by Talat himself, are to be found also in *Blackwood's Magazine* 213 (MCCXC) (April 1923), 425-440. References are on pp. 426, 436.]

Talat Paşa'nın hatıraları (The memoirs of Talat Paşa) (1946). Edited by E. Bolayır. Istanbul: Güven. 149 pp.

p. 74. Referring to the Armenian massacres, "some immoral and unscrupulous people were bent on personally profiting from the situation; such people were instrumental in producing many a crime . . . The information provided by Deputies [on this subject] was really heartrending."

[This aspect of the genocide is attested to in the following two reports by American High Commissioner in the Ottoman capital and a veteran diplomat, Lewis Heck. "The great majority of the Turkish officials in the interior are also the same officials who either actively participated in, or at least, condoned the massacres of the Armenians . . . the vast majority of the Turkish race heartily approved" of these massacres. *U.S. National Archives* R.G.256.867.4016/2, pp. 2, 3 of 9 January 1919 report to Washington. Similar statement in R.G.256.867.00/59, p. 3 of 20 January 1919 report. Even the Turkophile American Admiral Bristol, the successor of Heck, felt constrained to admit that "The character of the Moslem Turks is well-known. It is known that the Turks will rob, pillage, deport, and murder Christians whenever the opportunity is favorable from their point of view." R.G.59.867.00/1361, p. 1 of 22 October 1920 report.

Wartime American Ambassador Morgenthau was even more graphic about the participation in the widespread massacres by mobs of peasants who were armed "with clubs, hammers, axes, scythes, spades, and saws. Such instruments not only caused more agonizing deaths than guns and pistols, but, as the Turks themselves boasted, they were more economical, since they did not involve the waste of powder and shell."

p. 312. Morgenthau, Henry (1918). *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page. 407 pp.

Morgenthau's description of the assortment of implements used by mobs and Special Organization killer units is matched by similar details provided by a Turkish officer who was the military governor of the district of Yozgat in Ankara province. When narrating the series of carnages perpetrated upon the Armenian population of that district Major Salim mentions the use of hatchets, knives, sickles, large axes carrying hammers at the flip side, scythes, sticks and a host of cutting tools . . ." He characterized the ensuing mass murder as "a calamity never before recorded in human history. The ferocity of the massacres made one long for the methods used during the Inquisition period, staining the Islamic and Ottoman histories in the process" (*tarihi beşeriyetinin kayd etmediği inkizisyon mezalimine rahmet okutacak kitallar cinayetlerle tarihi İslam ve Osmani lekedar edilmiştir*). Deposition prepared at the request of the Court Martial. 5 January 1919. Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive. Series 21, File M, Doc. Nos. 576, 5771.

p. 120. "The assaults [against the Armenians] were made by some officials and the people."

[These charges, shifting the blame of the genocidal killings to subordinate officials and the ordinary people, are repeated in the final installment of the memoirs of Dr. Reşit, one of the most bloodthirsty provincial governors who berates the *milis* cadres, Turkish Muslim mobs, peasants, officials, and Circassian gendarmes for atrocious behavior in Diyarbekir province ruled by him, disclaiming personal responsibility. Dr. Reşit bey *ve hatıraları* (Dr. Reşit and his memoirs). *Yakın Tarihimiz* (Our Recent History). [Istanbul weekly. 1 March 1962 - 21 February 1963. Bound in four volumes, with extensive index organized around names and titles of articles dealing "with "memoirs, documents and photographs."] Third installment. 3 (1962), 363-365. The quotations are from pp. 364,365.

However, in a candid discussion with a Venezuelan officer enrolled in the Turkish army as a soldier of fortune, Dr. Reşit during the enactment of the genocide offered the following explanation: ". . . through some exceedingly prudent but very explicit remarks, he [Dr. Reşit] gave me to understand also that, in regard to the extermination of the Armenians of vilayet (province), he had merely obeyed superior orders; so that the responsibility for the massacres perpetrated there should rest not with him, but with his chief, the then Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey — one year later the Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha. Talaat had ordered the slaughter by a circular telegram." Nogales, Rafael de (1926). *Four Years beneath the Crescent*. Translated by Muna Lee. New York: Charles Scribner's. 405 pp. Quotations are from pp. 146, 147.]

Istanbul press:

Sabah, 14 December 1918.

"Talat Paşa had ordered the destruction of the Armenians" (Ermenilerin imhasını emretmiştir).

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya (1963). *Tek adam Mustafa Kemal* (Singular man Mustafa Kemal), Vol. I. 1881-1919.

P. 211. "The memoirs of the responsible İttihadists consist of odds and ends, reflecting an infantile simplism and a spirit of irresponsibility . . . None of these touch on events which were pivotal or were turning points, on culpabilities, on crimes, and on kinds of ineptness that ruined the army and the country. Their memoirs convey the impression that they are dwelling in a dream world. A plain game playing, typical of guilty men, is evident in their writings in which a few details are revealed to conceal the substance."

Kaynar, Reşat (Prof.) (1960). *Türkiyede hukuk devleti kurma yolundaki hareketler* (The Movements to Establish a law-Oriented State in Turkey). Istanbul: Tan. 196 pp.

p. 133. "It was the mentality of dictatorship which was mainly responsible for producing the accomplished fact of our intervention into the World War I. It was engineered, by resort to unconstitutional methods, by three individuals [Enver, Talat and Grand Vezir Said Halim] . . . They avoided dissolving the Parliament and they did not invalidate the Constitution, but they used all these institutions as tools for the realization of their wishes and desires. In anticipation of the day when they were likely to be called to account, they impelled these institutions to ratify their willful decisions. They hereby tried to shift responsibility to people lacking the requisite competence."

Army Commanders and Other High Ranking Officers

Vehib Paşa (Bükat)

Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive: Archive series 17, file H [pronounced Ho, the 16th letter of the Armenian alphabet, and not its variant Heel. Doc. Nos. 171-182.

The deposition prepared by General Vehib Paşa (*Yanyalı*) for the court martial (*tezkerayı cevabiye*), dated 5 December 1918, is the most explicit, unequivocal, and authoritative confirmation of the fact of the Armenian genocide and its premeditated and organized character. Having assumed the high command of the IIIrd Army, whose zone of operations embraced the six provinces where the largest clusters of Ottoman Armenian populations were annihilated prior to his appointment in February 1916, Vehib belatedly learned of the killing operations in these provinces. The pitiless massacre of 2,000 Armenians, roped together in rows of four while en route to a new labor battalion assignment, ordered by Vehib himself, had prompted the Turkish general to initiate a court-martial, as a result of which the gendarmerie commander of the Armenian contingent was convicted and hanged. In his proclamation, issued for the IIIrd Army following the execution, Vehib exhorted against the repetition of such "massacres" which were "ascertained by a court of law" (*amele kafflesini itlaf ettiği ba muhakeme sabit olduğundan*). Even though he condemned the reprisal atrocities against Turks by Armenian volunteer bands, three years later avenging in a small scale their personal family losses, Vehib in the main text of his affidavit inveighed against Ittihad, its Central Committee, and its provincial commissars, as the arch-schemers and the organizers of the mass murder. Here is his summary verdict:

The massacre and destruction of the Armenians and the plunder and pillage of their goods were the results of decisions reached by Ittihad's Central Committee . . . The atrocities were carried out under a program that was determined upon and involved a definite case of premeditation (*mukarrer bir program ve mutlak hir kasd tahtında yapılan işbu mezalim*). It was [also] ascertained that these atrocities and crimes were encouraged (*teşvik*) by the district attorneys whose dereliction of judicial duties in face of their occurrence and especially their remaining indifferent (*lakayd*) renders them accessories to these crimes (*feren zimethal*) (p. 5).

[Vehib's affidavit was read in its entirety at the second sitting of the Trabzon trial series (29 March 1919). Portions of it were incorporated in: (1) the Key Indictment, *Takvimi Vekayi*, No, 3540, 5 May 1919, p. 7, with which the 12-page, hand-written document was lodged;

(2) the Harput verdict, *Takvimi Vekayi*, No. 3771, 9 February 1919, p. 1; and (3) serialized in *Le Courrier de Turquie*, 1 and 2 April 1919. The copy of the full text in its original Ottoman Turkish is in the *Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive*. The details of the court-martial set up by General Vehib are in *Ariamard*, 10 December 1918, including the text in Ottoman Turkish of the General's proclamation through which he informed, as a warning, his IIIrd Army units of the verdict of the court and the execution of the gendarmerie commander involved.¹

Halil Paşa (Kut)

(1972). *Bitmeyen savaş* (A struggle without end). Edited by M.T. Sorgun. Istanbul: Yedigün publications. 381 pp.

Halil started his World War I career as military governor of the Ottoman capital (*merkez kumandan*). In December 1914 he was asked by War Minister Enver, whose uncle he was, to form the Fifth Expeditionary Force for the purpose of invading the Caucasus by way of Iran; the idea was to encircle and help destroy the Russian Caucasus Army, in pursuit of the Ittihadist Turanian dreams. Having disastrously failed in this endeavor, mainly because of the defeat at Dilman, which was being defended by an Armenian volunteer contingent led by the legendary hero Antranik, Halil in the summer of 1915 withdrew to the provinces of Van and Bitlis. The ensuing massacres against the heavy concentrations of Armenians in these provinces were particularly ferocious as the victims were slaughtered en masse near their towns and villages, instead of being deported. Taking over the command of the right wing of the IIIrd Army, comprising the 51st and 52nd divisions (the former Expeditionary Corps Nos. 1 and 5) and the Gendarmerie division at Van, Halil, with the active assistance of the governors of the two provinces, took the initiative in this lethal enterprise in the summer of 1915. He then commanded the 18th Army Corps in which the 51st and 52nd divisions were reconstituted. In January 1916 Halil became Commander of the VIth Army in Iraq. Finally, in the summer of 1918 he was promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group East that marched into the Caucasus and remained there until the Armistice. Throughout this period (1916-18) Halil, with the scheming of his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Vasfi Basri, systematically destroyed the Armenian populations of the areas falling under his control; he was especially methodical about the killing of Armenian officers and soldiers serving in his units, including those of the Russian Caucasus Army who were captured as prisoners of war.

p. 241. "I have endeavored to wipe out the Armenian nation to the last individual" (*Son ferdine kadar yok etmeye çalıştığım Ermeni milletî*).

In response to a charge relayed to him by a British captain visiting him in the Bekirağa prison where he, along with other top Ittihadists, was being kept in custody for later court-martial, Halil proudly and caustically asserted, in writing, that the number of his victims included, "300,000 Armenians . . . It can be more or less. I didn't count . . . 50-60,000 Arabs . . . 13 Jews . . ."

[Halil's genocidal activities are independently confirmed by the following sources. *German Foreign Ministry Archives*. A.A. Botschaft Konstantinopel 171. No. 60. German Musul Vice-Consul Holstein's 4 November 1915 report: "A colonel in the staff of Halil (probably his chief of staff Basri) told me just now that the Armenians in Musul too must be slaughtered . . . Halil's troops have already perpetrated massacres in the north." A.A. Türkei 183/45, A.A. Türkei 183/45, A33457. German Vice-Consul Scheubner Richter's 4 December 1915 report to Berlin: "Halil's expedition to northern Iran entailed the massacre of his Armenian and Syrian battalions" Zurlinden, S. (1918) *Der Weltkrieg*, Vol. 2. Zürich: Art. Institut O. Hissli, 725 pp.

"In two nights 15,000 Armenians were murdered in Musul; the bloodbath was carried out in darkness by Kurds and irregular soldiers. Without regard to age or gender, the victims were taken to the bank of the river in batches of ten and cut down with cold, blunt instruments. The order stipulated the sparing of powder and shell." [Quotation is from p. 707.]

Ali Ihsan Paşa (Sabis)

German Foreign Ministry Archives. A.A. Türkei 183/54, A44066.

The summer 1918, 20-page, report of German Embassy chaplain Lieutenant von Lutichau, details his experiences and observations during an extended inspection trip in the interior of Turkey. In it he focuses on the atrocities committed by General Ali Ihsan (Sabis). General Ihsan's genocidal activities more or less coincide with those of General Halil. The two were in charge of the 51st and 52nd divisions respectively. All the Armenians attached to these units, including physicians and pharmacists, were executed cold-bloodedly. Ihsan later assumed the command, first of the 13th, and subsequently of the 4th Army Corps (47th and 48th divisions). In September 1918, when in charge of the VIth Army (2nd and 14th divisions), Ihsan through deliberate measures of exhaustion and starvation caused the expiration of tens of thousands of Armenians.

pp. 12-13. "General A. Ihsan countless times and purposefully let the Germans know that he would not allow a single Armenian stay alive in his command zone." He bragged to German officers that "he had killed Armenians with his own hands" (*rühmte sich mit eigener Hand Armenier getötet zu haben*).

French Foreign Ministry Archives. Series E. Levant 1918-1940. Arménie 4. 1919 (folios 41-42).

The French Consul at Tabriz reported on 8 March 1919: "Ali Ihsan Paşa, formerly the Commander of the Army Corps stationed at Van, entered Tabriz at the end of June 1918 in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Forces in Azerbaijan . . . In an address to an Armenian delegation he said approximately the following: 'Let it be known that during my entry into Khoi I had the Armenians of the area massacred, without distinction of age and sex . . .' A few days later, during a reception of the Armenian Prelate Mgr. Nerses, the Paşa told him: 'I had a half a million of your coreligionists massacred. I can offer you a cup of tea.'" [The same quotation is in Radap, Etienne (1970). *La question arménienne reste ouverte. Etudes*, August-September 1970, p. 208. According to *Renaissance* (Istanbul French-language Armistice daily), 14 January 1919, General Ihsan had 10,000 Christian labor battalion soldiers killed in the VIth Army command zone.]

Süleyman Faik Paşa

Istanbul press:

Renaissance, 20 May 1919.

Süleyman Faik Paşa, Commander of Harput Cavalry Forces, told the court-martial, "I have in my possession all of Mahmud Kâmil Paşa's ciphers ordering the massacre of the Armenians."

Djagadamard, 18 May 1919.

Quoted verbatim and in original Turkish the Commander's statement was "*Mahmud Kâmil Paşanın Ermenileri imha ediniz diye vermiş emri telegrafları bende mevcuttur.*"

At the time he made this declaration during a pre-trial interrogatory to two members of the court-martial (i.e., Hayret Paşa, the president, and Nemrud Mustafa, a member who later replaced Hayret as president), Faik was a member of the court-martial in Bursa. During the war (May 1915-February 1916) he served also as military governor, chairman of the Draft Board and Interim Governor of Harput province, committing large-scale massacres within the boundaries of that province. During his subsequent testimony at the witness stand, however, General Faik, cowed since his earlier declaration by decrials and threats, recanted, denying having made such statements. Mahmud Kâmil was Commander of the IIIrd Army, February 1915-February 1916. It was during this period that the genocide was all but consummated in the six provinces falling under the military control of General Kâmil.

The Case of a Special Organization Major

The bibliographical import of this case is exceeded only by its fundamental implications for the mechanics of the Armenian genocide. At issue are authoritative and powerful sources, identified with Cemal Paşa's IVth Army Headquarters, and the evidence of the pivotal role of Ittihadist career officers, the so called *fedayîs*, in the enactment of that genocide through Special Organization killer units they commanded. In focusing on the cardinal role of a particular officer, Çerkez Ahmed, from Serez (Siroz), a district in Macedonia, Army Commander Cemal Paşa, his Chief of Staff General Ali Fuat Erden, his Private Secretary Reserve Lieutenant Falih Rifki (Atay), and Artillery Captain Ahmed Refik (Altınay), attached to the Intelligence Department at Ottoman General Headquarters, configure in a remarkable display of concurrence when commenting on an important aspect of the mechanics of the genocide alluded to above. These documentary testimonies are corroborated by historian-chroniclers Ziya Şakir and Fuat Süreyya (Oral), as well as by Rafael de Nogales, the Venezuelan volunteer officer serving as Ottoman Army Inspector-General of Turkish Forces in Armenia. Major Ahmed's infamous career as an ordinary criminal began with the assassination in the prewar years of anti-Ittihadist editors, Ahmed Samim and Zeki, engineered and subsequently covered up by Ittihadist chieftains. Following the 23 January 1913 overthrow of the anti-Ittihadist regime, in the course of which War Minister Nazim and one of his Adjutants were assassinated, Ahmed, who had disappeared, was exempted from future prosecution through the declaration of a general amnesty. He reemerged during the Armenian deportations, supervising the string of massacres in the eastern and south-eastern provinces of Turkey.

Erden, Ali Fuad (Retired Army Commander) (1954). *Birinci Dünya harbinde Suriye hatıraları* (World War I memoirs from Syria), Vol. 1. Istanbul: Halk Publishers. 225 pp. [Chief of Staff at IVth Army Headquarters]

p. 216. "The following telegram arrived from the Aleppo governor: 'The brigands Halil and Ahmed visited me today. They stated that having completed the massacres in the Diyarbakir area, they came to Syria to do the same for which purpose they said they are ready to receive the orders. I have them arrested. Awaiting your excellency's orders.'" After some hesitations, marked by timidity, Cemal Paşa, the Commander, is persuaded by his Chief of Staff to court-martial the two Special Organization brigands. Following protracted exchanges with Ittihad party leaders in Istanbul, where the two officers had managed to escape and take refuge, Cemal succeeded in having them returned to Damascus where the frightened Military Tribunal had to be ordered twice to commence court-martial proceedings. The two were tried, convicted and hanged in Damascus:

p. 218. "Among their belongings were found blood-stained ornamental gold coins."

p. 217. General Erden reflected thus: "Indebtedness to given executioners and murderers is bound to be heavy . . . those who are used for dirty jobs are needed in times of necessity (in order to shift responsibility. It is likewise necessary, however, not to exalt but to dispose of them like toilet paper, once they have done their job." It is equally revealing the cipher General Erden cites as having been sent to Cemal Paşa by Dr. B. Şakir acting in the role of a Director of the Armenian deportations; Şakir in that cipher makes clear that the deportations were intended to end with the Armenian victims perishing in the vastness of the desolate deserts south of Musul. Cemal's tense protest to Enver against Şakir's intrusion and haughtiness is quoted as follows:

p. 122. "I don't recognize any governor or military commander by that name. Why is this person meddling in this matter?" Cemal in the same vein forbade Şakir to send any more telegrams to him.

Atay, Falih Rifkî (1981). *Zeytinadağı* (Mount Olive). Istanbul: Ayyıldız. 140 pp.

Confirms the recalcitrance of İttihad leaders to surrender the two brigand chiefs by describing the protracted telegraphic exchanges between Istanbul and Damascus.

p. 67. "Finally Talat wired: 'Go ahead. This is a good opportunity to get rid of them.' . . . jewelry, women's rings, and earrings were found in their bags . . . these tramps had committed crimes to acquire wealth . . . In 24 hours the Court Martial reached its death verdict."

Refik, Ahmed (Altınay) (1919). *İki komite, iki kıtal* (Two committees, two massacres). Istanbul: Orhaniye. 79 pp.

pp. 38-39. In an encounter with Refik, Çerkez Ahmed inveighs against Talat for allowing him to be delivered up to Cemal. "I feel dishonoured. I served my country. I desolated Van and environs. Today, you can't find a single Armenian there . . . I killed off the Armenian Deputies Zohrab and Vartkes. I grabbed Zohrab, threw him down, took him under my feet and with a big rock crushed his head — crushed and crushed until I killed him off."

p. 40. Ahmed's "liquidation (*izalesi*) was certified by Cemal Paşa."

Şakir, Ziya (1946). *Yakın tarihin üç büyük adamı* (The three great men from recent history). Istanbul: Ahmet Sait publisher. 214 pp.

The author claims to have in his possession a copy of Talat's personal letter to Grand Vezir İzzet Paşa and a special file of documents containing some secret and top secret ciphers sent by Talat.

p. 57. İttihad had "assigned this bloody and murderous character secret duties. He had disappeared from the scene after assassinating (editor) Zeki, only to emerge when the Armenian deportations began; he was involved in the tragedy of Diyarbekir deportations."

p. 58. Verbatim reproduction of Cemal's handwritten cipher to Talat. An excerpt is as follows: "In as much as I am convinced that Çerkez Ahmed committed these crimes by the order of Diyarbekir governor Reşid, do you still find the liquidation of Ahmed absolutely necessary? Or, should I be merely content with Halil (his cohort)? Kindly respond by tomorrow evening."

Verbatim text of then Interior Minister Talat's response, 15/28 September 1915, 1517/15: "His liquidation in any case is necessary. Otherwise he will prove very harmful at a later date. Talat." Cemal the next day sent to Talat the following telegram of which he had made a rough copy:

p. 59. "The verdict against Çerkez Ahmed is execution. The requisite step will be taken in Damascus tomorrow morning."

Comments author Şakir: "We reproduced the cipher exchange without even changing a dot. Undoubtedly Çerkez Ahmed was a scoundrel who deserved to be hanged not once but nine times. With three words uttered by administrative chief Talat, the life of this creature, who was exploited for the sake of fanatic partisanship, was snuffed out."

Oral, Fuat Süreyya (1967). Türk basın tarihi 1728-1922, 1831-1922 (The history of the Turkish press 1728-1922, 1831-1922), Vol. 1. Istanbul: Yeni Aydın. 272 pp.

p. 254. "Çerkez Ahmed had shot dead opposition editor Ahmed Samim on 9 June 1910."

p. 199. "He cold-bloodedly walked toward the police station, barely 15 feet away, and entered it. Captain Abdulkadir, the chief of the station, who had watched the spectacle from the window, came to meet him. Kissing his forehead, he said: 'Bravo Ahmed . . . it was both a swift and clean job.' The murderer belonged to an officers' outfit founded by extremist Ittihadists, who organized such crimes."

Nogales, Rafael de (1926). *Four Years beneath the Crescent*. Translated by Muna Lee. New York: Charles Scribner's. 405 pp.

pp. 73. "A gentleman called Achmed Bey was seated upon my right, dressed in well-cut English tweeds. He spoke several languages perfectly, was a member of some of the best clubs in Constantinople, and had spent many years in London. With his aristocratic manners and his rather blasé expression, anyone might have taken him for one of the snobs driving four-in-hand along the avenues of Hyde Park. Yet this Achmed Bey was none other than the notorious bandit Tcherkess-Achmed, leader of a troop of Circassian guerillas who later on killed the Armenian deputies Zorab, Vartkes, and DagHAVARIAN in the Devil's Gulch, by the Governor's order; and one year afterwards was hanged in Damascus by Djemal Pasha, who feared that later on his own complicity in that assassination might be revealed!"

p.85. "Van governor ordered Çerkez Ahmed to make a raid with his bandits upon the surrounding hamlets, wherein, let me say in passing, only women and children remained. I shall not go into detail as to what Tcherkess-Ahmed did with those unhappy creatures. Suffice it to say that Djeveded himself felt obliged to reprimand his agent, whether sincerely or not, and that the very Kurds were appalled by his fiendishness."

Die Armenische Frage und der Türkische Standpunkt (The Armenian question and the Turkish viewpoint) (1919). Berlin Türk Yurdu publication. 18 pp.

p. 12. "The brigand-band of Çerkez Ahmed committed robbery and murder against the deportees."

Active and Reserve Officers of Lower Ranks

Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive. Series 21, File M, Doc. Nos. 574 577.

The written deposition of Major Mehmed Salim, Military Governor (Mevki Kumandan) and President of Draft Board (Şube Reisi) of Yozgat. Prepared on 5 January 1919 for the Yozgat trial series (5 February-7 April 1919).

p. 575. "We were carrying out the orders for deportation and exile without allowing assaults and robberies. Our standards of implementation revolved around probity and justice. But then Ittihadists, motivated by a drive for self-enrichment, entered the picture, sacrificing the principles of glory, self-respect and honor due to our sacred fatherland (*zengin olmak hevesine mukaddes vatanın şan ve şeref ve namus ve vakayı milliyeye fedadan çekinmeyen*). They sent to the government official and unofficial fraudulent reports, accusing the Armenians with unlawful acts with a view to disturbing the peace of the country to smearing the Armenians and to furnishing the rationale for the anti-Armenian measures mentioned above" (*asayişin ihlali için tertibatı fesadियeye*

teşebbus ederek Ermenileri lekeyebilecek resmi ve gayri resmi musarra işaretlerle makamata işgal ve hükümetin Ermenilere eylemesi esbabını mükem-meleyi mevcudleriyle ihzar ediyorlardı).

p. 576. "Interim governor Kemal, in the company of his cronies, the local officials, prepared the plan of next day's atrocities during nightly drinking orgies at the home of chief treasurer Vehbi. Kemal thus was carrying out the objectives of 'the national aspirations' of İttihad."

p. 577. "On 7/20 August 1915 civil authorities assumed complete control of the deportation operations; the Army would only assist upon request. I resigned from my post on 13/26 August 1915 as I was informed telegraphically Colonel Sükrü would replace me. The Armenians were sent to deportation with arms and hands tied (*eli kolu bağlı sevkedilen Ermeniler*). Thus many people, whether city dwellers or villagers, . . . pursued the deportee convoys (with all sorts of killing implements), in order to participate in the massacres — just like dogs smelling slaughter-house blood and running toward it. I hereby certify that these barbaric and dastardly deeds were entirely organized and directed by officials belonging to İttihad . . . the truth has to come out" (*kâmiten İttihad ve Terakki mensubetiyle memurinden . . . tertip ve idare edildiğini . . .*).

Atay, Falih Rıfı (1981). *Zeytindağı* (Mount Olive). Istanbul: Ayyıldız. 140 pp. [Reserve Lieutenant with duties at IVth Army Headquarters]

p. 64. The author was with Turkish feminist writer Halide Edib in a train bound for Aleppo when Dr. B. Şakir boarded the train at Adana. Following his introduction to her, Şakir began to recite his genocidal exploits in the eastern provinces. When Şakir departed, Edib expressed her indignation to Atay with the words: "I am saddened that you got me to shake the hand of a murderer" (*katil*).

Dünya, 17 December 1967. Atay's weekly column *Pazar Konuşması* (Sunday talk).

The above story was repeated with the following reflections: "Şakir was bent on eliminating the Armenian nation in order to prevent the formation of a future Armenia . . . Had the Armenians remained concentrated in the East, there is no doubt that in 1918 at the time of the Armistice they undoubtedly immediately would have created an Armenia [see the American-educated publicist A.E. Yalman's identical comment below] . . . Genocide is one of the gravest crimes against humanity . . . I don't believe in the right of retaliation" (alluding to Turkish genocidal killings as reprisals against the Armenians).

Refik, Ahmed (Altınay) (1919). *İki komite*, iki kıtal (Two committees, two massacres). Istanbul: Orhaniye. 79 pp.

Refik, a career officer with the rank of Captain, was assigned to the Intelligence Department at Ottoman General Headquarters. The aim of the İttihadists was not just punishing those Armenians sabotaging the Turkish war effort but:

p. 23. "to annihilate the Armenians and thereby do away with the Eastern provinces question" (*Ermenileri imha etmek*).

At the start of the war many brigands were sent to Anatolia from Istanbul; these brigands consisted of murderers and robbers released from prisons. "After a week's training at the War Ministry's barracks they were dispatched to the Caucasian border as Special Organization cadres. They perpetrated the greatest crimes against the Armenians" (*Ermeni mezaliminde en büyük cinayetleri bu çeteler ika ettiler*).

pp. 34, 42. "When one of the daughters of General Liman von Sanders, the head of the German Military Mission to Turkey, saw the wretched deportees in transit in Eskişehir, she

exclaimed: "Oh, what a pity! What do they want from these poor little children, these innocents? Why don't they punish the guilty ones . . . The real culprits whose heads should be chopped off are the Talats, the Envers, that despotic Cabinet. The rivers are carrying human torsos, the heads of children. This spectacle is tearing one's heart. But one day they will be called to account. German officers have taken pictures of these mutilated corpses.' No government has ever committed such a savage crime." [These accounts were serialized in *İkdam*, 23-29 December 1918.]

Istanbul press: *Alemdar*: A series of three articles in the second half of June 1919, under the title "The Inside Story of the Deportations" (*Tehcirin İç Yüzü*), by Hasan Amca, a career officer of Circassian origin and a member of the Officers' Deliverance Group (*Halaskâr Zabitan*).

Hasan Amca was commissioned by Cemal Paşa to oversee the resettlement in Hawran of the remnants of Armenian deportees in August 1916. But he was thwarted by İttihad's regional representative Neşad, who was pursuing the goal of the complete demise and dissolution of the surviving Armenians. In an article full of anger and indignation published in the opposition paper *Alemdar* on 6 April 1919 he exclaimed: "... who killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians. Forget the terms 'deportations', 'massacres', and say 'the decision to exterminate the Armenians.'"

Admissions by Historians, Publicists, and Other Authors

Avcıoğlu, Doğan (1974). *Milli kurtuluş tarihi* (History of national liberation), Vol. 3. Istanbul: Istanbul publishers. 1732 pp.

p.1114. "The liquidation of the Christian elements was determined upon in the course of deliberations which were held at the War Ministry and which lasted months. Enver Paşa appointed as Army Corps chiefs of staff young officers whom İttihad could trust. They were summoned to Istanbul and briefed on the situation."

p. 1135. "Hundreds of thousands of Armenians in a very short period of time and *en masse* were driven to areas beyond Anatolia. The Special Organization and trusted İttihadists schemed and executed this comprehensive and systematic deportation which aimed at radically solving the Armenian question, and which, it was evident, was endorsed by the Germans. Dr. Behaeddin Şakir championed in the councils of the Central Committee of İttihad this policy of deportation. The implementation of the deportations is bound to produce, however, an impossible situation when it is endorsed with relish."

Emin (Yalman), Ahmed (1930). *Turkey in the World War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 305 pp.

Referring to "the policy of general extermination" Emin describes the underlying rationale as follows:

p. 220. "A dense Armenian population in the Eastern Provinces has proved to be a danger to the very existence of Turkey . . . The instrument to remove this danger ... shall be universally despised and condemned."

Hocaoğlu, Mehmed (1976). *Arşiv vesikalarıyla tarihte Ermeni mezalimi ve Ermeniler* (The Armenian atrocities and the Armenians in the light of archive documents). Istanbul: Anda edition. 866 pp.

p. 521. "The Armenian deportations radically solved the reform problem which for years had become the foremost headache of the state."

Istanbul press: *Tasviri Efkar*, 7 October 1916. Ittihadist Yunus Nadi (Abaloğlu) editorial.

After declaring that the path of "integration and amalgamation" proved an abortive path since "the Armenians on whom we were counting as the element closest to us did not join; their committees consorted with our most dangerous enemy," Nadi interprets the outcome (tehcir) as follows: "The known policy of solidarity among the populations is bankrupt; the era of 'a clean-up' for our fatherland has begun."

Governors

Celal

Istanbul press: *Vakit*, 10, 11, 13 December 1918.

In these installments Celal, a one-time Interior Minister, a former Dean at Istanbul University (1908-09), governor of Aleppo (1911-15) and Konya (June-September 1915), lamented "the terrible crime perpetrated upon the Armenians." In response to his "request for funds to resettle the surviving deportees Talat sent instead a Director of Deportations to handle the matter . . ." (11 December). His arrival coincided with the application of "the most barbaric methods" which entailed "the actual extermination of the deportees." (13 December). He was eventually removed from his post at Aleppo and transferred to Konya from where he futilely continued to warn Talat and his acolytes of the dangers for Turkey of the Armenian tragedy.

Tahsin (Uzer)

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3540, 28 April 1919 sitting, publication date 5 May 1919.

p. 6. A 15 July 1915 cipher from Erzurum governor Tahsin is cited in which he is denouncing the role of the Special Organization brigands launching "assaults and attacks" (*taadiyat ve tecavüzet*) against Armenian deportee convoys. He is urging his government to "end these exceedingly shameful misdeeds of the brigands and the gendarmes attached to them, who are operating under the name of the Special Organization" (*bilhassa Teşkilatı Mahsusa namı altında türeyen çetelere her taraftan nihayet verilmesi*). [Hasan Tahsin (Uzer) was governor of Van 27 March 1913-30 September 1914, of Erzurum 30 September 1914-10 August 1916, of Syria 10 August 1916-20 June 1918, and of Smyrna (Izmir) 30 October 1918-22 November 1918.]

Istanbul press:

Jhamanag, 12 December 1918.

During the pre-trial investigations conducted by the Mazhar Inquiry Commission charged with gathering evidence on the wartime "misdeeds" (*seyyiat*) of the officials, Tahsin publicly declared on 11 December 1918: "I shall respond to interrogatories with documents and proofs."

Renaissance, 3 August 1919.

At the second sitting of the Harput trial series (2 August 1919) Tahsin testified that Dr. B. Şakir was authorized to use coded ciphers when the latter was in Istanbul.

Tasviri Efkar, 11 February 1919.

"Tahsin holds Dr. B. Şakir and IIIrd Army Commander Mahmud Kâmil Paşa responsible for the Armenian massacres."

[This assertion is foreshadowed in the report of German Lieutenant-Colonel Stange who was

in charge of a Turkish regiment conducting guerilla operations against the Russians in the Caucasus. Describing the Armenian mass murder as the result of "a long before entertained plan" (*einen lang gehegten Plan*), Stange blamed Dr. B. Şakir and Kâmil Paşa by name as the principal organizers of the holocaust; he even quoted the latter as having bragged that "after the war there will be no more an Armenian Question." *German Foreign Ministry Archives Botschaft Konstantinopel*. 170. No. 3841. 23 August 1915 "secret" report to the German Military Mission to Turkey.]

Münir (Akkaya)

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3540, 28 April 1919 sitting, publication date 5 May 1919.

p. 7. The Court cites a 14 December 1918 cipher from the Erzurum governor Munir (Akkaya) [who like Tahsin later joined the Kemalists] testifying to the fact that the Armenian deportee convoys were subjected to "massacre and plunder" (*katl u garate maruz*) as arranged by "Ittihad Central Committee member Behaeddin Şakir."

Reşid

Rustow, Dankwart A. (1959). The army and the founding of the Turkish Republic. *World Politics*, XI (4), 513-522.

p. 523. "Reşid Paşa, a Unionist who had been dismissed as governor of Kastamonu for his criticism of the Talat government's Armenian pogrom policy ..." [This dismissal by Talat, along with other dismissals for identical reasons, is mentioned in *Takvimi Vekayi*, No.3540, pp. 6, 18; No. 3557 p. 101.]

Ottoman Parliament's Chamber of Deputies

Hafiz Mehmet

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3540, 28 April 1919 sitting, publication date 5 May 1919.

p.7. Trabzon's young lawyer-deputy Hafiz Mehmed is also cited in terms of his disclosure that the common method of extermination of the Armenians of his province was "drowning them" (*gark*) on the coasts of the Black Sea by placing them on board (*irkâp*) boats and then throwing them overboard. The Deputy further testified that he informed Talat of these crimes but the latter refused to take any preventive or punitive action.

Şakir

Istanbul press:

Nor Giank, Renaissance, 12 February 1919.

At the 4th sitting of the Yozgat trial series (11 February 1919), Yozgat Deputy Şakir told the Court at the witness stand that the Armenian populations of Boğazlıyan and Yozgat had been systematically massacred through orders of Kemal, the "butcher" (*kasab*) governor of these localities. Kemal was so omnipotent that Şakir did not dare to send wires to the central government lest they be intercepted; but Şakir testified that he personally informed Talat in Istanbul.

Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive. Series 21, File 7, No. 494.

In his deposition of 5 December 1918, prepared at the request of the Mazhar Inquiry Commission, Deputy Şakir focused on the pervasive abuses of authority and criminal activities of Kemal mentioned above. At one point he quotes (p. 2 of the report) Kemal as saying that

after doing a thorough job with the liquidation of Bogazliyan Armenians, he expects to be promoted to the rank of district governor (*mutasarrıf*). Şakir ends his affidavit thus: "Even though I have not personally seen his issuing orders for massacre and have not seen with my eyes the massacres themselves, I am as certain of the truth of these charges as if I personally had observed the atrocities."

The Dim Prospects of Filling the Bibliographical Gaps

THE CONSPIRATORIAL SECRECY OF İTTİHAD

Çavdar, Tevfik (1984). *Talat Paşa*. Ankara: Dost publications. 503 pp.

p. 190. "The dual character of the organization [İttihad party] was being maintained in a definite way . . . Its secret character was nurtured and explored through a separate organization. The entire body exactly resembled an iceberg comprising visible and invisible parts."

p. 210. "Talat was also aware of the capability of the secret part of İttihad to easily slide in illegal undertakings."

Tunaya, Tarık Z. (1952). *Türkiyede siyasi partiler 1859-1952* (Political parties in Turkey 1859-1952) Istanbul: Doğan Brothers. 758 pp.

p. 182. "İttihad was a power-wielding monopolistic clique which issued orders from behind the curtains (*her şeyi perde arkasından hükmeden*)... the great Empire was in the hands of these eight individuals . . . operating secretly and in an organized fashion behind a mysterious curtain . . . a secret oligarchy which resorted to weapons whenever it could not silence ideas ..."

Akşin, Sina (1980). *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihad ve Terakki* (The Young Turks and İttihad in the context of 100 questions). Istanbul: Gerçek publications. 312 pp.

p.54. As early as 1906 İttihad founders expressed unwillingness or reservations regarding admission to membership of non-Muslims and non-Turks, despite article 6 of its statutes allowing such membership.

p. 156. "Contrary to its rules stipulating the promotion of the unity of the various elements under a system of Ottomanism, İttihad disallowed non-Turks becoming members of its Central Committee. Its secrecy was meant to cover the discrepancy between its [theoretical] program of Ottomanism and its [practical] application of a program of Turkism. Moreover, the practice of secrecy was probably due to the modus operandi of an organization which did not recoil from murdering people in order to achieve its political goals" (*siyasal amaçlarına ulaşmak için adam öldürmekten kaçınmıyan*).

THE FUNCTIONAL SECRECY OF THE SPECIAL ORGANIZATION

Vardar, Galip (1960). *İttihad ve Terakki içinde dönemler* (The inside story of İttihad). Edited by S.N. Tansu. Istanbul: İnkilâp. 414 pp.

p. 275. "The Special Organization's mission was two-pronged: internal as well as external. It had to adapt to the exigencies of the war for which purpose brigands and brigand leaders were secured. The prevailing spirit was that developed in the Balkans in pursuit of brigands . . . The direction of the Special Organization devolved, following some discussion, neither upon Enver nor Talat, but the Central Committee."

p. 244. "The guidelines for the operation of the Special Organization were elaborated at the Central Committee."

Ertürk, Hüsameddin (1957). *2 Devrin perde arkası* (Behind the scenes of two eras). Edited by S.N. Tansu. Istanbul: Nurgök. 572 pp.

pp. 216-218. The Special Organization's secrets needed to be protected. "Talat urged the retention of Ittihadism in the post-war period through a secret organization" (p. 217) which resulted in the reengagement of former Special Organization leaders.

Esath, Mustafa Rağıp (1975). *Ittihad ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi* (The mysterious curtain

in the history of Ittihad). Istanbul: Hürriyet publications. 712 pp.

p. 258. "The Special Organization was intended to function as an instrument for the realization of Ottoman state's internal and external policies . . . It was created by Ittihad's Central Committee. Its Ittihadist leaders were chosen jointly by Talat and the Central Committee . . . brigands were attached to the organization."

Hiçyılmaz, Ergun (1979). *Belgelerle Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa casusluk örgütü* (Documents on the Special Organization, the spy outfit). Istanbul: Unsal publications series No. 1. 218 pp.

p. 102. "The Special Organization was initiated and buttressed by Enver Paşa to thwart separatist movements which were sweeping the country. The organization's foremost goal was the consolidation of political unity."

THE SPECIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ANTI-ARMENIAN MEASURES

Kutay, Cemal (1962). *Birinci dünya harbinde Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* (The Special Organization during World War I) Istanbul. Ercan. 318 pp. [A great deal of data in this book is supplied, through direct quotations, by Eşref Kuşçubaşı, who became the head of the Special Organization, following the death of its co-founder, Colonel Süleyman Askeri.]

p. 18. E. Kuşçubaşı: "It is a fact that the Special Organization performed services which the forces at the disposal of the government and the law and order outfits absolutely couldn't. The measures taken for these services applied to areas within the borders of the Ottoman Empire where non-Turkish and non-Muslim races and nationalities constituted the majority of these areas' populations, and which were always suspect in terms of their bonds and loyalty; to the central authorities. These services were kept so very 'secret' that even Cabinet ministers were unaware of them ... The Organization's plan involved the undertaking of measures by virtue of which the damages of past legacies which the Ottoman state had been carrying on its shoulders as the burden and bequest of the centuries could be reduced to a minimum. When I think about it today I too find this plan 'exceedingly courageous'" (*aşırı cesareti*).

p. 36. "The Special Organization, a secret outfit, was to become the fundamental edifice for ensuring the internal and external security of the Ottoman state . . . For this purpose it cultivated its own cadres, uniforms, treasury, and ciphers, becoming a state within a state; in assuming duties which exceeded normal bounds, it had acquired a moral personality. In pursuit of its three principal goals, namely, unifying Turkey (*muhtelif unsurların birliği*), Islamic Union, and Pan-Turkism, the

organization carried out the state's internal and external policies by accomplishing most important and at the same time dangerous tasks."

p. 78. "I had assumed duties [in operations which revolved around] the inside story of [the Armenian deportations]" (*Ermeni tehciriyle alakadar ... hadiselerin iç yüzünde vazife almış bir insan olarak*).

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3549. 8 May 1919 fourth sitting, publication date 15 May 1919.

p.63. Statement of court-martial presiding judge interrogating Colonel Cevad, former Military Governor (*muhafiz*) of Istanbul: "The War Ministry verbally informed us that there were two kinds of Special Organization. One was run by the War Office, the other was attached to the Ittihad party; the written text of this information will follow."

No. 3553 (3554), 12 May 1919 fifth sitting of the court-martial trying the Wartime Cabinet Ministers and top Ittihadist leaders (misprinted 14 May), publication date 21 May 1919.

p.88. Testimony of Central Committee member Yusuf Rıza: "The second kind of Special Organization was created to implement the deportations in certain provinces, districts, and counties as the gendarmerie in these localities did not dispose of sufficient forces to carry them out."

p. 90. The presiding judge interrogating Ittihad leader Küçük Talat (Müşkara): "Your colleague Rıza testified that due to the insufficiency of gendarmerie forces in some provinces needed for deportation business a new Special Organization was created which was different from that belonging to the War Ministry."

No. 3561, 17 May 1919 seventh sitting, publication date 29 May 1919.

p. 124. Presiding judge interrogating Yusuf Rıza again: "The other day you stated that there was another Special Organization as distinct from that identified with the War Ministry."

MINISTERIAL TESTIMONY ON OFF-THE-RECORD DECISIONS

Harb kabinelerinin istivabı (Wartime cabinet ministers' hearings 6 November-19 December 1918). Istanbul: *Vakit* [Turkish Istanbul newspaper] special supplement No. 2. 620 pp.

p. 203. Testimony of former Public Works Minister, General Cürüksulu Mahmud Paşa: "There are no transcripts on this because no records were being kept [in the Cabinet Council meetings]."

p. 347. Testimony of former Education Minister and top Ittihadist Ahmed Şükrü in response to a question on decisions respecting Turkey's intervention in the war on the side of Imperial Germany: "Depending on the degree of importance of the matter, decisions may be rendered off the record, i.e., verbally, or in writing .. the decision reached in the Cabinet Council is communicated by the Grand Vezir and the Foreign Minister verbally or in writing, in any way they wish."

Former Grand Vezir Said Halim Paşa testifying:

pp. 290-291. Referring to the Armenian massacres, "I heard about this tragedy when it was all over, just like about everything else .. You have to address the War Ministry for the explanation you are seeking."

p. 295. Referring to the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenians and Arabs: "Yes. I had no knowledge about some evil things."

pp. 325-326. "The reports of the commissions which were sent to the interior to investigate the abuses [against the deportees] were for months withheld from me. It was evident that the Interior Ministry was determined not to divulge their contents and to conceal them by contriving excuses."

CONFIRMATION BY HISTORIANS OF THE PRACTICE OF SECRECY IN HIGH-LEVEL DECISION-MAKING

Kutay, Cemal (1983). *Talat Paşanın gurbet hatıraları* (Talat Paşa's memoirs in exile) Vol. 3. Istanbul: Kültür. 1568 pp.

p. 1490. "The structure of the Special Organization necessarily remained secret . . . its ranks embraced the very valuable staff officers of the army and old and experienced commanders. From the civilian sector, they drew the select and renowned personages, identified with the fields of arts, literature and religion. The members of Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), the focus of the power, force and will of Turkish nationalism enrolled as cadre units in the ranks of the Special Organization. The Special Organization operations could not have been incorporated in the literature and state archives since the organization was an entirely secret outfit. It was involved in actions which had the nature of accomplished facts, and which were the results of individual and personal decisions" (*şahsi ve ferdi kararlar*).

Yalman, Ahmed Emin (1956). *Turkey in my time*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 294 pp. [American-educated publicist and historian]

pp. 34-35. İttihad "ruled wartime Turkey, largely in secret for not even the party knew many of its Council's decisions."

Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahid (1962). Ölüm yıldönümünde Talat Paşa (Talat Paşa on the anniversary of his death). *Yakın Tarihimiz*, 1 (March). [Istanbul weekly]

p. 89. "For us the nature and organizers of the deportations always remained a secret. All questions on this question were constantly met with vague answers . . . In any case, even a steely will may not be sufficient to reach such a terrible decision which, however, was clearly necessary for the sake of the country." [The author was a prominent İttihadist and Editor of *Tanin*, the mouthpiece of İttihad, as directed by its Secretary General, Midhat Şükrü.]

Avcioğlu, Doğan (1974). *Milli kurtuluş tarihi* (History of national liberation), Vol. 3. Istanbul: Istanbul publishers. 1732 pp.

p. 1114. "The requisite preparations for the liquidation of the Christian elements were kept secret even from the ministers."

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet (1953). *Türk inkilâbı tarihi* (The history of the Turkish revolution), Vol. III: 1. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society. 521 pp. [The late Dean of Turkish historians] On the Records of the Cabinet Council.

p. 484. "Actually, the most important decisions were secretly made among two or three people. It is, therefore, natural that they do not show up in the Transcripts of the Cabinet Council. However, in cases of extreme importance, or when it was deemed desirable to implicate the responsibility of some people, written records were kept on the respective decisions of the Cabinet Council." [It is noteworthy to point out in this connection that Special Organization Chief Eşref Kuşubaşı expressed his indignation at the news of the assassination in Rome by an Armenian "avenger" of Grand Vezir Said Halim, declaring the latter totally innocent in as much as the real nature of the scheme of anti-Armenian measures was known only by two or three ministers, according to Kuşubaşı, who stated:

"It is a singular crime and injustice to make a martyr out of him on charges of complicity in crimes associated with the Armenian deportations. As a man deeply involved in this matter I firmly reject this false accusation." From p.78 of Kutay, Cemal (1962). *Birinci dünya harbinde Teşkilât-ı Mahusa* (The Special Organization during World War I.) Istanbul: Ercan. 318 pp.]

Morgenthau, Henry (1918). *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page. 407 pp. One final piece of evidence of surreptitiousness may be in order:

pp. 140, 143-4. When visiting then Interior Minister Talat at his home for some urgent business, the American Ambassador was surprised to see that Talat was transacting official business through a telegraph instrument installed in his home. This fact was verified in the memoirs of Talat's wife which appeared in installments in the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*. The 21 December 1982 issue contains this confirmation.

The Emergence of Denial as a Cultural Imperative

RANDOM SAMPLES

Istanbul press: *Alemdar*, 5 July 1919.

Hasan, Amca, anti-Ittihadist officer: "This country doesn't have the guts to face the truth [regarding the Armenian genocide]."

Ministry of Public Education (*Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı*) of the Turkish Republic. Department of Education and Training. Circular No. 140. I July 1983. *Official Bulletin*. Publication date 29 August 1983.

p. 334. "Concerning the review of the recommendations made in the 1 September 1980 and No. 2069 issue of the Official Bulletin regarding the Abridged Historical Atlas and the use as auxiliary textbook in high schools and lyciums of Historical Atlas, edited by Faik Reşit Unat.

"The words 'Armenia' and 'Ermenistan' (the Turkish word for Armenia), which are found in pp. 10, 11, 15 of the aforementioned atlases, and which probably are reprinted on the different pages of the various editions of these works, are to be wiped. Following the creation of a Director or Deputy Director, the stipulations contained in the appended circular are exactly to be applied to these atlases. Moreover, the same procedure is to be followed in the case of other atlases carrying the drawbacks specified in the annexed circular."

International Herald Tribune, 26 December 1986. News article by Sytske Looijen.

"In Istanbul, the publisher of a Turkish edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica *faces charges of weakening Turkish national feelings* because the work says an Armenian state existed in southern Anatolia in the 11th century. Isfendiyar Bariounu, chief prosecutor at the state Security Court, said the statement was 'contrary to historical facts.' If found guilty, Hulya Poturoglu, the publisher, could be sentenced to four and half years in prison." (Italics in the original)

Hotham, David (1972). *The Turks*. London: John Murray. 206 pp.

p. 182. ". . . Armenia is a ghost, or perhaps more aptly a skeleton in the Turkish cupboard. It is a body whose flesh was long since picked clean. In all that beautiful country between Van and Ararat, where the Armenian kingdom once flourished so

brilliantly, there is today only a memory — and a terrible one. Few peoples, not even the Jews, have had a more ghastly history than the Armenians. The massacres and holocausts within living memory were only the last in a whole chain of disasters which befell this extraordinary people . . . Nearly a million Armenians were killed or deported from Turkey at the end of the Ottoman empire, on the orders of the Young Turk dictatorship, until the moment came when Talat Pasha could announce proudly: 'We have done more to solve the Armenian problem in three months than Abdul Hamid did in thirty years.'

p. 183. ". . . all Turks, so far as I have been able to judge, are adamant on the Armenian question. No Turk I have ever met, however sophisticated and westernized, or however well I personally knew him, has ever in my hearing shown a sense of guilt about the fate of the Armenians, or admitted moral responsibilities for it. Divided on most other questions, the Turks seem united on this."

p. 185. ". . . The Turks did a terrible thing, which can never be forgotten, but (to repeat) one must remember these two somewhat mitigating facts: first, that a series of disastrous wars and defeats had driven the Turks to desperation, and the last straw was the apparent betrayal of the Armenians; secondly, the Turkish population had not only been encouraged, but actually ordered, to carry out the massacres by the odious Young Turk triumvirate (with Talat Pasha as the man chiefly responsible), and the killings and deportations were conceived by that government, coldly and deliberately, as a 'solution' to the Armenian problem."

REACTIONS TO POSTWAR INTERIOR MINISTER CEMAL'S DISCLOSURE OF "800,000 ARMENIANS KILLED DURING THE DEPORTATIONS"

Istanbul press: *Hadisat*, 17 March 1919.

Publicist and wartime governor Süleyman Nazif's retort: "This act [of disclosure] is not worthy of a Muslim minister."

Bayar, Celal (1969). *Ben de yazdım* (I too have written), Vol. 7. Istanbul: Baha, pp. 2075-2309.

p. 2114. The retort of Bayar, former Ittihadist Responsible Secretary, Aydin province, and President of Turkey 1950-60: "the ugliest and most unnecessary manifestation" of a spirit of appeasement to the victors.

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet (1963). *Atatürk: hayatı ve eseri* (Atatürk: his life and work). Ankara: Güven press. 357 pp.

p. 268. The retort of Bayur, the late dean of Turkish historians: "The most unnecessary and ugly manifestation . . . served to supply the great powers proof and weapons with which to crush us."

MUSTAFA KEMAL (ATATÜRK)'S AMBIVALENT POSTURE

Kaghtzrouni, Arshavir (1983). When, where, and how I met Mustafa Kemal Pasha. *Lraper*, No. 31, 7 May 1983. [Last installment of a series of articles. The first two appeared in the 12 and 19 September 1981 issues of this Los Angeles Armenian weekly. The author served as the valet of Heinz Foelner, Chief Engineer at Baghdad Railway, who served as Mustafa Kemal's host during the latter's Fall visit in Aleppo in 1918.] "In 1918 I was serving as Mustafa Kemal's guide for some tours in and around the city of Aleppo while working as Mr. Foelner's valet. Kemal on several occasions expressed

his scorn by calling Talat *çingene pici*, *postacı Talat* (Gypsy son of a bitch, postman Talat), and Enver *ahmak-yaltak* (fool-sycophant). He attentively and with compassion listened to my tales of atrocities through which the Armenians were being exterminated. He impressed me as a man who harbored sympathy and friendly feelings for the Armenians, so much so that I often asked myself why the monsters Talat and Enver could not be as kind as this man, why were they destroying my nation. Mustafa Kemal's fury against these men as arch criminals was expressed in his last words of condemnation, "They are the kind of men who should be hanged, great assassins" (*asılacak herifler, büyük caniler*).

Prax, Maurice (1920). Constantinople. *Lectures pour tous*. March. [The author was correspondent of the French newspaper *Petit Parisien*.]

p. 829. "I also knew a severe and weird little man who was very interesting; he was my neighbor at Pera Palace hotel . . . During my interview with him he stated, among others: 'We were betrayed by the Ittihadists. Enver, Talat, Cemal and all their accomplices, deserve the gallows. Why do the Allies delay to have these rascals hung'" (*Qu'attendent les Alliés pour faire pendre toute cette canaille*). [Portions of the *Prax* article appear in an English translation under the title "Life in Constantinople Today" in *Current History*, 12 (May 1920), 334-336.]

Hildebrand, Emile (1926). Kemal promises more hangings of political antagonists in Turkey. *Los Angeles Examiner*, 1 August. Sunday edition. Section VI. [The author was a Swiss artist and journalist.]

p. 1. The Ittihadists "should have been made to account for the lives of millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly driven en masse from their homes and massacred."

Rauf Orbayın hatıraları (The memoirs of Rauf Orbay) (1962). *Yakın Tarihimiz* (Our recent history), 3.

p. 173. Quoting American General Harbord, the head of the American Mission, conducting an investigation in 1919 in Turkey and Armenia on the feasibility of an American mandate for the area, Rauf reproduces the words of Mustafa Kemal who is deploring the fact that: "In America, France, and England too, many people are being killed and other crimes are being committed yet no nation is being accused. Only the Turks are being held responsible for the massacre of 800,000 of their own people [i.e., the Armenians]" (*Yalnız Türkler ... sekiz yüz bin kişinin katlinden sorumlu oluyor*). These gestures of condemnation and proddings for Allied retributive justice, exercised for external consumption, are somewhat vitiated, however, by the domestic exercise of caution and circumspection vis-à-vis the Turkish public, as noted below.

2000 *e doğru*, No. 23, 29 May-4 June 1988. [Istanbul Turkish weekly]

Reports on a statement made by Mustafa Kemal to the Deputies of the Grand National Assembly on 24 April 1920, the second day of the opening of that gathering on which there were two sessions, an open and a closed one. At the latter session Kemal described "the massacre of the Armenians which took place at the start of World War I" as "a shameful act" (*fazahat*). The weekly's source is the periodical *Sacak*, January 1987. The speech is published by the Institute for the Study of the History of the Turkish Revolution. See Kemal, Mustafa (1945). *Atatürkün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (The speeches and declarations of Atatürk), p. 49. Publication series no. 1. 398 pp.

Celal, Tahsin (1988). Regards tures sur la question arménienne (Turkish views on the Armenian question). *Les Temps Modernes*, 43(504-505-506), 70-77.

The author reveals the fact that Ahmed Refik (Altınay), the prolific historian at Istanbul University and the former teacher of Atatürk at War Staff College (Harbiye), whose invaluable book *İki komite, iki kıtal* has often been cited in this study, had a public altercation with Atatürk. The issue of contention was Refik's exposure of the facts of the Armenian genocide, along with subsequent Armenian acts of reprisals, and Atatürk's personal displeasure about the disclosures on the genocide. As related by Celal (p. 76), historian Refik's work was not only banned as a result, but he lost his university position, was banned from public life, and was condemned to destitution. [In a commemorative book, published in the wake of his death (10 October 1937), it is revealed that Refik's ensuing poverty had reached such a point that he did not have sufficient funds even to pay for his medications, dying in dire need and as a pauper. *Ahmet Refik* (1938). Edited by R.E. Koçu. Istanbul Sühulet. 186 pp. The reference is on pp. 22, 29.]

Postscript: The Liabilities of Ottoman Archives

Despite the multitude of problems expounded in this study, Turkish authorities in a new campaign of public relations have mobilized their scholars to render Ottoman archives accessible to outsiders interested in the study of the Armenian question, particularly the events of World War I respecting deportations and massacres. The idea is that Western and other historians will be allowed to see for themselves that there are no authentic documents proving premeditated, organized, and supervised massacres which are tantamount to genocide. This has been the stance maintained in the past seventy years by Turkish scholars, most of whom have either been working for or have been attached to the Turkish Historical Society, a quasi-governmental organization overseeing the out-put of these scholars.

TRADITIONAL BIASES IMPEDING UNFETTERED RESEARCH

Cohn, Edwin J. (1968). The climate for research in the social sciences in Turkey. *Middle East Journal*, 22(2), 203-212.

p.203. "Not infrequently, there is also a feeling (in many quarters of Turkey) that research workers pry into matters which are best left alone, produce awkward findings which challenge traditional assumptions, and generally create trouble"

p. 205. "There is in addition, a widespread feeling that foreign scholars ... do not have that country's welfare at heart . . . Foreign scholars should try to view Turkish problems in proper perspective"

p.207. "Highly sensitive topics such as anything having to do with ethnic or religious factionalism are best avoided, especially by the foreign investigator ..."

Rustow, Dankwart (1968). Atatürk as founder of a state. *Daedalus*, Summer, 793-824.

p.820. "The National History Thesis — on the basis of a mixture of truth, half-truth, and fiction (involved) the kind of tendentious rewriting of history .. characteristic of many early nationalisms."

THE DISARRAY IN OTTOMAN ARCHIVES

Stoddard, Philip Hendrick (1963). *The Ottoman government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: a preliminary study of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms. 245 pp.

p.230. "Compared with the vast literature on the first World War in English, French, and German, the documentation in Turkish is most incomplete. Many factors account for this deficiency: the chronic confusion in the archives of the Ottoman General Staff during the war . . . the disappearance during the occupation of Istanbul after 1918 of many important official papers."

Küçük, Yalçın (1979). *Türkiye üzerine tezler 1908-1978* (Theses regarding Turkey 1908-1978), Vol. 2. Istanbul: Tekin. 713 pp.

p. 633. "The history of the War of Independence is being prepared at the War History Department of the Directorate of General Staff by retired officers who have no historical training ..."

p. 634. "What a pity and what an incomprehensible affair. A state which prides itself so much by its history is denying access to its historical archives to anyone who is not part of the group of official historians (*resmi tarihçiler*). Many of these official historians, however, are even unable to handle the use of quotation marks, let alone history-writing. They are at the same time abridging, changing, and using quotation marks in connection with a report that is part of a document . . . Whenever there is denial of access, there is bound to be concealment. The engagement of untrained retired officers who have no relationship whatsoever to historical education is an attempt to cover up. Yet, it is not so easy to cover up history."

EXAMPLES OF CARELESSNESS OF OTTOMAN ARCHIVISTS

Documents (n.d.). Prime Ministry Directorate General. Vol. I. In English and French. Edited by B.N. Simşir, member of the Turkish Historical Society. 289 pp. (English version), 304 pp. (French version).

The documents deal with the events of World War I involving the Armenians of Turkey; they were first published in the periodical *Military History Documents* (December 1982, No. 81) under the auspices of the Military History and Strategic Studies Department of the Turkish General Staff. Here is a list of *randomly* detected inaccuracies and incompleteness of translation, and errors in date conversion from the English version:

1. p.28, Doc. No. 11: Tahsin in 1917 was governor of Damascus, Syria, not Erzurum.
2. p. 56, Doc. No. 20: 7.4 should be 8.4.
3. p. 68, Doc. No. 25: Arabic numeral is converted into 240 instead of 270.
4. p. 72, Doc. No. 27: 4,700 rubles should be 47,000 rubles.
5. p. 83, Doc. No. 29: in a conversion error, 11 June should be 10 June.

Moreover, the date conversion for item No. 4 is correct on p. III, but incorrect on p. 9; likewise, item No. 5 has the correct date of September 13, but an incorrect 14 date on p. 11. Still on the same page, item No. 7 is 11.10.14 and on p. 18 it is 1.10.14, both being wrong; the correct date is August 10, 1914. These errors recur in the French edition, which *additionally* has the following flaws:

1. p. 95, Doc. No. 28: the translation from Ottoman is both incomplete and faulty.
2. pp. 17, 90, Doc. No. 20. The date is given as May 2, but on p.5 it is May 1.
3. p. 102, Doc. No. 29: in item 4, the 227 figure is a misprint for 277.
4. p. 109, Doc. No. 32: the date is given as missing, and on p. 6 it is given as 29.7.1915 instead of 19/20.7.1915 as indicated in the original Ottoman text.

In Volume 2 of the English version (188 pp.) similar carelessness is evident. For example, on p. 45, Doc. No. 99: in item No. 2, 7 September should be 27 September.

THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF THE CRUCIAL DOCUMENTS

During the first week of January 1989 Turkish authorities announced a new decision to release sets of official documents from Ottoman archives covering the entire gamut of five centuries of Turko-Armenian relations, but especially the World War I cataclysm. (See *Resmi Gazete*, No. 20163, 12 May 1989, pp. 1-6, containing the Cabinet Council's pertinent No. 89/14028 decision.) Subsequent clarifications indicated, however, that the preparations of the pertinent files extended only up to the year 1894, and that it will be some time before the World War I period documents would be ready for inspection and study (Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz 16 May 1989 statement. *Cumhuriyet*, 22 May 1989). There are several problems involved in this new initiative which call for depiction.

1. The decision so far applies to the prime ministerial archive (*Başbakanlık arşivi*). Access to the War Ministry, General Staff and Imperial General Headquarters or War Office archives, the prime sources on the wartime treatment of the Armenians, is still strictly by special permit. Hitherto, only rarely have such permits been issued. (See Çetin, Atilla [1979]. *Başbakanlık arşivi kılavuzu* [Guide for the başbakanlık archive]. Istanbul: Enderun. 171 pp.)
2. The Turkish authorities reserve the right to deny access to material the release of which they may choose to define as risky for the safeguard of "national defense or public order, or when a document could adversely affect Turkey's relations with other states or between two foreign countries" (Article 10, subsections a and b). This means the maintenance of the current procedure which is more intended to encumber rather than to facilitate research, and necessitates the decision-making involvement of the authorities charged with safeguarding national security.
3. The archives of the Special Turkish Military Tribunal which was set up by postwar Turkish governments to prosecute and punish the authors of the Armenian genocide constitute a vital part of the material documenting the most critical period of Turko-Armenian relations. Yet these are nowhere to be found. Recent public disclosures suggest, if not indicate, that Turkish authorities decades ago tried to get rid of the bulk of these archives containing the ensemble of a vast corpus of pre-trial investigatory papers, sets of authenticated official documents implicating high-ranking governmental and party (İttihad) officials, and the courtroom testimony of hundreds of witnesses and defendants. Two sources of such disclosure warrant attention:

Kutay, Cemal (1983). *Talat Paşanın gurbet hatıraları* (The memoirs of Talat Paşa in exile), Vol. 3. Istanbul: Kültür. 1548 pp.

p. 1044. The author uses a Chinese proverb as a metaphor to declare that the court-martial archives are gone. Paraphrased, the proverb states that when some material is too hot to handle, there will be very few brave men willing to risk possessing it. "These files [of the court-martial] were either burned in the stokeholes of public baths (*hamam külhanlarında*) or were among the 56 wagonloads of historical documents (*tarihi beige*) which left the country as they were sold to Bulgaria at the price of *70 para* per one *okka*" (one *para* is the equivalent of one-sixtieth of a Turkish *lira*, and one *okka* weighs about 2.8 lbs).

Caraman, Pierre (1989). L'ouverture des archives d'Istanbul. *Nouvel Observateur* (Special edition on Armenia), January-February.

p. 145. "The year 1931 proved to be a landmark in the history of Ottoman Archives. Defying the most elementary rules, the government of Mustafa Kemal decided to sell the contents of a considerable part of the Archives to Bulgaria — at the price of its value as paper. The idea was to erase from human memory four centuries of Ottoman history. More discerning than the Turks, the Vatican bought these documents from Bulgaria at a price which for that time was rather high. As soon as the news of the sale broke out in Istanbul, the intellectuals cried 'scandal'; a sudden interest began to spring up and envelop the remaining Archive depositories. As a result, between 1932 and 1937, 184,256 items, whether registers or documents, were classified under 17 categories, with the collaboration of the Turcolog Lajos Fekete. In 1937, the *Hazinei Evrak* disappeared and was supplanted by the new *Başvekalet Arşivi* (The Archives of the Directorate of the Prime Ministry) . . . The Turkish authorities will allow the most 'green' foreign historians to consult data which will consist of selected, deleted and sanitized documents lest the present government is compromised relative to the problems of the Armenian genocide. Linguist-archivists, who have been working in these archives for more than a decade, have taken care of this project as far as the need for purging is concerned . . . It is most likely that nothing new will emerge from this new arrangement of accessibility. One has to be truly naive or inept to believe in the obverse. The history of this tragic period has already been written and the archives of all other countries already contain and preserve the unalterable evidence of the first genocide of the twentieth century ... As former Ambassador Zeki Kunalalp declared: 'The liabilities of not publishing the historical documents outweigh the advantages.' It is for this deplorable (Turkish) obsession (for concealment) that we rely upon foreign documents to learn about our history."

These explanations of the new Turkish initiative, meant to serve the purpose of confirming the Turkish stance on the issue of the Armenian genocide, are indirectly reinforced by official statements made in connection with the opening of Ottoman archives:

1. Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz, on state television, 2 January 1989: "The allegations of genocide are a slander against the Turkish nation. Everybody knows that the Turkish nation is extremely sensitive on this subject. The Turkish government, which denies the genocide, has not changed its position." *The Guardian* (London), 4 January 1989.
2. Inal Batu, Foreign Ministry Spokesman: "We certainly hope that after the archives open Turkey will have the means to refute in the eyes of the world Armenian claims of genocide." *The Times* (London), 4 January 1989.

THE DECEPTIVE STRATAGEM OF TWO-TRACK ORDERS

Atay, Falih Rifkî (1981). *Zeytinadağı*. Istanbul: Ayyıldız. 140 pp.

pp. 24-25. After describing how Talat double-crossed a job-seeker by secretly informing a governor that he should ignore his written recommendation which the latter had solicited and obtained from him, Atay describes "Talat's penchant for deceptiveness and lies as characteristic of his Oriental ethics" (*yalan, aldatıcı*)."

Istanbul press:

Vakit, İkdâm, 7 March 1919.

The cipher of Boğazlıyan, county gendarmerie commander, informing his superiors at Kayseri that the Armenians from the area "were deported, namely destroyed" (*sevkiyat, yani mahv manasına*) (Yozgat trials, 12th sitting).

Renaissance, İkdâm, Yeni Gün, 23 February 1919.

The same county's Recruitment Bureau Chief is informing the Deputy Commander of Ankara's Fifth Army Corps that the deportees were "sent off to their destination" (*müretteblerine sevk*), namely, "they were killed" (*katledildikleri*) (Yozgat trials, 9th sitting). [For confirmation of these references see the subsection "Acts of Avoiding Material Evidence" of the section "Problems of Deflection ..." in the Bibliography, citing Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate sources and data.]

Jhamanag, 29 March 1919, *Renaissance*, 12 February 1919; *Le Courrier de Turquie*, 14 February 1919.

Yozgat Deputy Şakir personally testified that deportation orders were countermanded by "secret" extermination orders and that when he complained to Talat in Istanbul about these misdeeds the latter dismissed him as "incompetent" (Yozgat trials, 4th sitting).

Jhamanag, 29 March 1919.

A district commissioner, Colonel Mehmed Ali, personally testified that orders for "deportation" were countermanded by orders for "destruction" (Yozgat trials, 15th sitting).

Takvimi Vekayi. No. 3540, 28 April 1919 sitting, publication date 5 May 1919.

p.5. A former staff member in Talat's Interior Ministry supplied evidence about Talat's plenipotentiary in Aleppo, executing the deportations, that the latter confided to him about "personally receiving Talat's orders of extermination" (*imha emirlerini bizzat aldım*). [For more details on these testimonies and on analogous testimony by high-ranking German military and diplomatic personnel, including General Seeckt, the last Chief of Staff of Ottoman Armed Forces, and German Ambassador Metternich, see: Vahakn N. Dadrian (1986). The Naim-Andonian documents on the World War I destruction of Ottoman Armenians: the anatomy of a genocide. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 18(3), 311-360, especially pp. 346 n. 19, 347 n. 31, 355-356 n. 104.]

THE ANKARA GOVERNMENT'S 1920 EMULATION OF THE TWO-TRACK METHOD OF ORDERS TO COVER UP A LETHAL DECISION

Karabekir, Kâzım (1969). *İstiklâl harbimiz* (Our war of independence), 2nd ed. 1104 pp. [1st ed. 1960]

pp. 844. Cipher telegram from Ankara's Interim Foreign Minister Ahmed Muhtar, 8 November 1920, advising Turkish General Karabekir, who had overwhelmed the fledgling army of the infant Republic of Armenia and was to start armistice negotiations with her representatives: ". . . the Ankara government harbors profound and genuine sentiments (*amik ve samimi*), consistent with its aspirations to foster the welfare of the Turkish Armenian and other neighboring peoples alike . . ." These professions are reinforced by

pledges of support for "the complete independence and security" of Armenia, and by promises to dispatch "food supplies and other material assistance so that she may be able to recover economically."

Yet, the "secret" cipher below, wired the same day, decrees the genocidal death warrant of the remnants of the Armenian people, concentrated in the Transcaucasus and enveloped with all kinds of life-threatening crises:

pp. 844-845. "By virtue of the provisions of the Sèvres Treaty Armenia will be enabled to cut off Turkey from the East. Together with Greece she will impede Turkey's general growth. Further, being situated in the midst of a great Islamic periphery, she will never voluntarily relinquish her assigned role of a despotic gendarme, and will never try to integrate her destiny with the general conditions of Turkey and Islam. After the enumeration of these rationales the following decision was transmitted. 'Consequently, it is indispensable that Armenia be eliminated politically and physically (*siyaseten ve maddeten ortadan kaldırmak*).' The General was further advised on the requisite methods to be employed. Since the attainment of this objective is subject to [the limitations of] our power and the general political situation, it is necessary to be adaptive in the implementation of the decision mentioned above (*tevfiki icraat*). Our withdrawal from Armenia as part of a peace settlement is out of the question. Rather, you will resort to a modus operandi intended to deceive the Armenians (*Ermenileri igfal*) and fool the Europeans by an appearance of peace lovingness. In reality, however, (*fakat hakikatde*) the purpose of all this is to achieve by stages the objective [stated above] . . . [I]t is required that vague and gentle-sounding words (*mübhem ve mülayim*) be employed both in the framing and in the application of the peace settlement, while constantly maintaining an appearance of peace lovingness towards the Armenians." The cipher ends with the exhortation that "these instructions reflect the real intent (*makasidi hakikiyesi*) of the Cabinet. They are to be treated as secret, and are meant only for your eyes." (In the first edition, the corresponding page is 961).

THE DOUBTS OF SOME TURKISH HISTORIANS

Dr. Mete Tuncay: "He feared that those documents which were to be made available could already have been censored. He also noted, 'or it's possible they will still only open them to researchers who will confirm the official thesis, such as Stanford Shaw.'" *Cumhuriyet* (Turkish daily, Istanbul), *The Guardian* (London), 4 January, 1989.

One Turkish academician "who wished to remain anonymous" said: "Some scholars felt a sword of Damocles hanging over them, fearing that if they published something unfavorable to the Turks their research permits would be revoked." *The Guardian* (London), 17 January 1989.

Ali Sirmen, Turkish publicist: "We should no longer offer to foreigners viewpoints which can easily be imposed upon on domestic audiences; this practice is wrong and unnecessary. It is even time that these viewpoints be removed from the repertoire serving the needs of internal circulation . . . Even the Germans, who perpetrated the greatest genocide, were forgiven when the Nazis were purged from the scenes. Why should the Turkish people of today be held responsible for the deeds of the Ottomans . . . We need first to change our mentality; we have got to change our internal structure that is inimical with the ideal of human rights . . . The most important step in the solution of the Armenian question is the correction of the mentality which is reigning supreme in today's Turkey." *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 10 June 1989.